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ABSTRACT

AN AGENT-BASED EXPLORATION OF THE HURRICANE FORECAST-EVACUATION
SYSTEM DYNAMICS
by
Austin R Harris
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2022
Under the Supervision of Professor Dr. Paul Roebber

In the mainland US, the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system is uncertain, dynamic,
and complex. As a result, it is difficult to know whether to issue warnings, implement
evacuation management strategies, or how to make forecasts more useful for
evacuations. This dissertation helps address these needs, by holistically exploring the
system’s complex dynamics from a new perspective. Specifically, by developing – and
using – an empirically informed, agent-based modeling framework called FLEE
(Forecasting Laboratory for Exploring the Evacuation-system). The framework
represents the key, interwoven elements to hurricane evacuations: the natural hazard
(hurricane), the human system (information flow, evacuation decisions), the built
environment (road infrastructure), and connections between systems (forecasts and
warning information, traffic). The dissertation’s first article describes FLEE’s
conceptualization, implementation, and validation, and presents proof-of-concept
experiments illustrating its behaviors when key parameters are modified. In the second
article, sensitivity analyses are conducted on FLEE to assess how evacuations change
with evacuation management strategies and policies (public transportation, contraflow,
evacuation order timing), evolving population characteristics (population growth,
ii

urbanization), and real and synthetic forecast scenarios impacting the Florida peninsula
(Irma, Dorian, rapid-onset version of Irma). The third article begins to explore how
forecast elements (e.g., track and intensity) contribute to evacuation success, and
whether improved forecast accuracy over time translates to improved evacuations
outcomes. In doing so, we demonstrate how coupled natural-human models – including
agent-based models –can be a societally-relevant alternative to traditional metrics of
forecast accuracy. Lastly, the fourth article contains a brief literature review of inequities
in transportation access and their implication on evacuation modeling. Together, the
articles demonstrate how modeling frameworks like FLEE are powerful tools capable of
studying the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system across many real and hypothetical
forecast-population-infrastructure scenarios. The research compliments, and buildsupon empirical work, and supports researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in
hazard risk management, meteorology, and related disciplines, thereby offering the
promise of direct applications to mitigate hurricane losses.
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PREFACE

This dissertation marks a major moment in my career. I want to take a minute to
acknowledge – and reflect on – the journey to becoming a Doctor in Atmospheric Science.
On 5/3/99, the “weather seeds” were planted on my brain. That F-5 tornado in Moore, OK
passed 1-mile from our home. I wrote afterwards, “I will go to the Oklahoma school of
meteorology. There I’ll work as a storm chaser. Eventually, I’ll work in the severe storms
lab issuing warnings etc.” Basically, I had the unique privilege of recognizing a dream
early in my life, and with the support of two wonderful parents, actually achieved it.
I graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 2013 with a B.S. in Meteorology. After
applying – and being denied – entrance to 15+ graduate programs, UWM was the first
and only graduate program to offer me a scholarship. I took it, and after two years at
UWM, left with an M.S. in Atmospheric Science, forecasting experience at Innovative
Weather, and an offer for my first “big boy” job at the Warning Decision Training Division
(WDTD) of the National Weather Service (NWS). There, I joined a team of instructors
teaching forecasters how to issue thunderstorm, flash flood, and tornado warnings. It was
my childhood dream, actualized.
Though I was immensely proud of my new role in meteorology, it was not my
meteorological home.
After Katrina (2005) and evacuations from the El Reno tornado (5/31/13), I felt that
“accurate” forecasts were not necessarily “good” forecasts and that the weather
community needs research focusing on societal impacts of forecasts (e.g., like the
interdisciplinary work of Drs. Rebecca Morss, Julie Demuth, Kim Klockow, and many
1

others). Knowing this belief and interest, and seeing an opportunity to simulate
evacuations using agent-based models, Dr. Paul Roebber asked if I would return to
graduate school to study this topic. After many conversations, I agreed, knowing Paul
was the right advisor, and that this was a golden opportunity to get into an area of
research I felt strongly about.
Early in the Ph.D., Paul connected me with Dr. Rebecca Morss at NCAR. Rebecca kindly
agreed to serve on my committee and help me navigate the social science literature
needed to model evacuations. Through Rebecca and Paul’s support, the project has
become something I’m extremely proud of. It would not be possible without them. In
addition, Rebecca connected me to other interdisciplinary scientists through NCAR’s ASP
colloquium and the Graduate Visitor Program. In this community, I’ve found my
meteorological home.
This dissertation marks my entrance into this scholarly community. From here, I intend to
support the weather enterprise for many years to come.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the US, the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system is uncertain, dynamic, and
complex. Take Hurricanes Irma (2017) and Rita (2005), cases where accurate but
uncertain forecasts triggered evacuations — and severe traffic jams — in Florida and
Texas, respectively. As the forecasts shifted and traffic worsened, some evacuees
became even more exposed than had they remained in-place (Cangialosi et al. 2018;
Wong et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2007; Knabb et al. 2006). Despite forecast information
being as useful as one can reasonably expect given current forecast skill, the cases
illustrate the complexities of people using inevitably imperfect information to make
evacuation decisions before the storm, and they demonstrate how evacuations involve
many physical-social parts and uncertainties that change as the storm approaches the
coast (e.g., Morss et al. 2017; Barton 2014; Miller and Page 2007; Watts et al. 2019).
Because of these complex dynamics, safe and efficient hurricane evacuations can be
difficult to achieve.
Empirical studies explain important aspects of evacuations, such as how forecasts,
warnings, and other factors influence evacuation decisions (e.g., Huang et al. 2016;
Lindell and Perry 2012; Baker 1991). However, it’s impossible to empirically study all
aspects of evacuation across multiple cases. Computational models, on the other hand,
provide a complementary tool where empirical knowledge can be codified and used to
run virtual experiments for many scenarios, real or synthetic (e.g., Morss et al. 2017;
Blanton et al. 2018). The entire forecast-evacuation system has not been represented in
one computational framework, however, with models focusing on specific aspects only
(e.g., evacuation traffic only, or evacuation decision-making only).
3

This dissertation explores the hurricane-forecast-warning system dynamics from an
agent-based, computational perspective which compliments, and builds upon, empirical
work. The model includes representations of the forecast, evacuation decision-making,
and evacuation traffic together in one framework for the first time. By performing
experiments on the unique model system, the study becomes the first to examine the
hurricane evacuation system holistically i.e., to establish the relative importance of
factors, key interactions between systems, and non-evident emergent patterns.
The work takes the form of a series of manuscripts which have been – or are in the
process of being – published by academic journals. Detailed literature reviews are
provided in each article and tailored to their specific purposes. Drs. Paul Roebber and
Rebecca Morss are co-authors on the manuscripts, and thus, are co-authors for the
dissertation (note: I will reference “we” throughout, as they greatly contributed to the
articles).
The first article details and describes the agent-based modeling framework i.e., its
conceptualization, implementation, and the empirical data which it is based. Though
intended for a broad, international audience, the work is most useful for evacuation
modelers, as it contains detailed information about the model’s structure and reasoning
behind its development. The research has been peer-reviewed and published in the
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (Harris et al. 2021).
The second article provides a first-order look at the systems dynamics, by using the model
to explore how evacuations change with evacuation management strategies and policies
(public transportation, contraflow, evacuation order timing), evolving population
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characteristics (population growth, urbanization), and real and synthetic forecast
scenarios impacting the Florida peninsula (Irma, Dorian, rapid-onset version of Irma). The
primary intended audience are researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in hazard
risk management.
The third article begins to explore how individual forecast elements, such as forecast track
and intensity – and their improved accuracy over time – translates to evacuation success.
As such, the research benefits meteorology by demonstrating how coupled naturalhuman models provide a societally-relevant alternative to traditional metrics of forecast
“accuracy” e.g., by measuring the impact of forecasts elements on how people make
evacuation decisions and physically evacuate.
The fourth article is a brief literature review on carless households in the US and whether
inequities exist in hurricane evacuations as a result (they do). Through the literature
review, the idea is to ensure future evacuation modeling studies do not contribute to
inequities, and instead, are used to identify and reduce them across many forecastpopulation-infrastructure scenarios.
To my colleagues in the weather and hazards communities, I offer the following articles
to help advance new methods for studying hurricane evacuations, to better support
practitioners/policy-makers aiming to improve evacuations, to change how forecast
verification is done across the weather enterprise, and to help cultivate a shared
understanding across disciplines of the entire hurricane-forecast-warning system. This
last point is especially important for meteorology, as the community often struggles to
understand why improved forecast accuracy does not always translate into increased
public safety.
5

ARTICLE 1
AN AGENT-BASED MODELING FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE DYNAMICS
OF THE HURRICANE-FORECAST-EVACUATION SYSTEM

1. Introduction
Hurricanes Irma (2017) and Rita (2005) demonstrate how, in the mainland US, the
forecast-evacuation system is uncertain, dynamic, and complex. For example, Irma’s 310-day forecasts indicated the storm was likely to make landfall as a major hurricane
somewhere in Florida, with the most likely track near Miami, triggering the largest
evacuation in US history (FDEM 2017). However, the forecast track shifted slightly
westward as the storm approached, with eventual landfall near Tampa Bay–St.
Petersburg, a common evacuation destination in the event, while leaving Miami largely
unscathed (Cangialosi et al. 2018; Wong et al. 2018). Similarly, uncertainties in Hurricane
Rita’s track and intensity forecasts, combined with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, led
to mass evacuations and severe traffic jams in Houston–Galveston. The worst of the
storm missed the area, but had Rita struck Houston–Galveston directly, the
consequences could have been severe, as many evacuees were stranded on area roads
(Zhang et al. 2007; Knabb et al. 2006).
The events are relevant since the forecasts were fairly accurate, with the westward shift
of Irma’s track falling within the National Hurricane Center’s cone of uncertainty
(Cangialosi et al. 2018), and Rita’s forecast track being less erroneous than most (Knabb
et al. 2006). However, forecasts were less successful in providing useful guidance for
many affected by the events, despite being as useful as one can expect given current
6

forecast skill. These cases illustrate the complexities of people using inevitably imperfect
forecasts to make evacuation decisions well before the storm arrives, and they
demonstrate how evacuations involve many interacting physical-social parts and
uncertainties which evolve over time (e.g., Morss et al. 2017; Barton 2014; Trainor et al.
2012; Miller and Page 2007). Because of these complex dynamics, safe and efficient
evacuations can be a formidable challenge.
Empirical studies provide insight to different aspects of hurricane evacuations, such as
how forecasts, warnings, and other factors influence evacuation decisions (e.g., Huang
et al. 2016; Lindell and Perry 2012; Baker 1991). However, it is difficult to empirically
study all aspects of evacuations across multiple cases. Computational models, on the
other hand, provide a complementary tool where empirical knowledge can be codified
and used to run virtual experiments for many different hurricane scenarios, real and
synthetic (e.g., Morss et al. 2017, Watts et al. 2019). Recent research demonstrates the
potential of modeling the hurricane evacuation system together in one framework (e.g.,
Watts et al. 2019; Blanton et al. 2018). With that we ask: can a modeling framework be
designed to holistically investigate the complex dynamics of the hurricane-forecastwarning system i.e., to determine which factors are important and how they interact
across a range of scenarios?
To answer this question, we introduce a new modeling framework, FLEE (Forecasting
Laboratory for Exploring the Evacuation-system). FLEE includes several empiricallyinformed models representing key, interwoven aspects of real-world hurricane
evacuations: the natural hazard (hurricane), the human system (information flow,
evacuation decisions), the built environment (road infrastructure), and connections
7

between systems (forecasts and warning information, traffic, impact zones). The
hurricane and forecast information are represented using data and products from the
National Hurricane Center (NHC), a component of the U.S. National Weather Service
(NWS) which is the leading authority for real-time hurricane forecasting. Two agent-based
models (ABMs) replicate 1) the flow of information and evacuee decision-making, and 2)
evacuation infrastructure, routing, and traffic. These models are conceptually and
numerically interconnected as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A conceptual overview of FLEE which includes models of the three interconnected systems of
hurricane evacuations: (a) the natural hazard (b) the human system, and (c) the built environment,
represented by NHC forecast products and two ABMs, respectively (italics). Forecast and warning
information (purple), evacuation traffic (light blue), and impact zones (gold) serve as conceptual links
between systems. Coupling the individual models (a-c) via these links makes FLEE a hybrid agent-based
and system dynamics model (Martin and Schlüter 2015) uniquely positioned to perform experiments
impossible to conduct in the real-world.

8

This article has two primary objectives. First, to overview the conceptualization and
implementation of FLEE. This includes describing the model components, which are
designed to represent key aspects of real-world hurricane evacuations, while remaining
sufficiently idealized to build fundamental and practical knowledge (e.g., see Watts et al.
2019; Sun et al. 2016, discussion in Section 2). The article’s second aim is to show results
from experiments demonstrating how FLEE is uniquely positioned to examine the
hurricane-forecast-warning system dynamics. That is, how it can explore the effects of
altering different factors, interactions among system components, and to show how largescale patterns of evacuation can emerge from individual decisions of many
heterogeneous agents interacting with each other and with their physical-informational
environments.

Preliminary experiments are performed on a simplified representation of the Florida
peninsula – a place frequently visited by tropical systems (Keim et al. 2007) – and for
Hurricane’s Irma and Dorian, which affected these areas in 2017 and 2019. FLEE was
designed to be flexible, however, and thus the modeling framework can be modified to
study other regions, hurricane scenarios, and multi-hazards e.g. hurricanes followed by
flooding or cascading failures such as loss of power networks, damage to roads etc.
This research builds on previous work which models the hurricane evacuation system by
expanding the components of the full system represented within the same modeling
framework. For example, one body of work uses ABMs to study evacuation planning (e.g.,
Madireddy et al. 2011; Zhang et al 2009; Chen 2008, 2012; Zhan and Chen 2008; Chen
and Zhan 2004, 2006). Such work focuses on evacuation traffic while using highly
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idealized representations of the forecast and warning information and evacuation
decision-making. Meanwhile another body of work uses ABMs and other models to study
information flow and evacuation decision making but does not include representations of
evacuation routing and traffic (see, e.g., Dixon et al. 2017; Yin et al. 2014; Widener et al.
2013; Watts et al. 2019; Morss et al. 2017; Czajkowski 2011; Hasan et al. 2013). Arguably
the most comprehensive model of the hurricane evacuation system is Blanton et al.
(2018) and Davidson et al. (2018), as they integrate the forecast, evacuation decisions,
and evacuation traffic into one system. However, its representation of information flow
and evacuation decision making were fairly simplistic as these models were designed for
operational use.
Modeling frameworks like FLEE, which represent the entire hurricane-forecast-warning
system, can support researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in a variety of
disciplines. This includes hazard risk management, which would benefit from increased
knowledge of the relative effectiveness of evacuation management strategies. The
evacuation modeling community would benefit from improved understanding of
evacuation, which provides better rationale for variable selection in future models. In
meteorology, modeling frameworks like FLEE can provide a societally-relevant alternative
to traditional measures of forecast accuracy, by showing how forecasts influence
evacuation success. Lastly, by looking at the system holistically, these modeling
frameworks can cultivate shared understanding across these disciplines, a need
emphasized by Bostrom et al. (2016).

10

2. Modeling framework and implementation
This section describes FLEE’s components and design (Grimm et al. 2020). The modeling
framework was developed using Fortran due to familiarity with the language but could be
developed using existing agent-based software. For further details, the commented code,
a model description, and input files are available for download at the CoMSES model
library

(https://www.comses.net/codebase-release/4cd05855-f387-48bd-8899-

9d62375518cb/).
FLEE can run on multiple operating systems, including MacOS, Linux, and Windows, and
on computers with average memory and cores (e.g., we used computers with 2 cores and
4 GB memory). Simulations typically require 3-5 days of real-time. Though it cannot run
in quasi-real time on a desktop computer, the paper’s goal is proof of concept – improving
run time is a key next step for more practical use.
The modeling framework includes a spatially explicit virtual world representing a
geographical area of interest (described in section 2.1); a dynamic hurricane – and
forecast information about it – that passes through that world (section 2.2); a multi-agent
model where information is interpreted by millions of heterogenous agents and used to
make evacuation decisions (section 2.3); and a traffic model where agents move across
the virtual world as the hurricane approaches (section 2.4).
ABMs were chosen to represent the human system (Figure 1b) and the built environment
(Figure 1c) as the models capture individual’s decision-making processes and
interactions between agents, making them excellent tools for investigating complex
system dynamics (e.g., see Miller and Page 2007; Barton 2014; Hammond 2015, Rand
11

and Rust, 2011). Another reason is that ABMs have proven capable of simulating
evacuation decisions in hurricanes (see, e.g., Dixon et al. 2017; Yin et al. 2014; Widener
et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2009; Watts et al. 2019; Morss et al. 2017) and hurricane traffic
dynamics (e.g., Gehlot et al. 2019; Ukkusuri et al. 2017; Liang et al. 2015; Chen and Zhan
2008). One drawback of ABMs is their high computational expense, which makes them
less suitable for operational use (e.g., pros/cons in Bazghandi 2012).
To design and implement FLEE, we integrated across multiple relevant areas of
expertise, including agent-based modeling, meteorology, emergency management,
protective decision making, risk communication, social vulnerabilities, and traffic
modeling. As in any modeling effort, aspects of FLEE are simplified and some real-world
processes are not represented. Decisions about what to include were based on our
research goals (e.g., to explore the broad system dynamics), review of relevant literature,
and discussions among our research team. These decisions are discussed throughout
Sections 2.1–2.4.
2.1. The virtual world
FLEE’s virtual world is a 10 x 4 cellular representation of the north-south axis of Florida,
an area susceptible to hurricanes (Keim et al. 2007) and which has experienced mass
evacuations such as Irma (2017). The grid spacing is coarse by design (40 grid spaces
of 69-km x 69-km each) as the project’s goal is to explore the broader system dynamics,
and to provide a starting point for more complex experiments. Census data informs the
spatial distribution of agent households on the abstracted grid as well as household
characteristics (which then influence evacuation decisions as discussed in section 2.3).
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For the built infrastructure, virtual highways and interstates designed to simulate key
aspects of Florida’s road network are overlaid on the model grid (section 2.4). These
roads allow agents to move between grid cells for evacuation. Details regarding the
construction of each model system (i.e., the natural hazard, the human system, and the
built environment) and the key connections between them is provided in the next three
subsections.
2.2.The natural hazard (hurricane, forecasts, and warning information)
FLEE includes a hurricane that approaches and can move through the model domain
(Figure 1a). The storm and its forecasts can be real or synthetic; here we simulate real,
historical storms using archived NHC forecast products which were issued in real-time.
The products include information about the observed storm characteristics (Table 1) and
official forecast information (Table 2), both of which update every 6-hours (both in FLEE
and in the real-world). When taken together, the products capture the critical storm
information and its evolution as the storm approaches. We chose to use NHC products in
this implementation rather than meteorological model ensembles (as used in Blanton et
al. 2018; Davidson et al. 2018) because they more closely resemble forecasts seen by
the public (Demuth et al. 2012), and can be systematically perturbed to assess the
evacuation’s sensitivities to the forecast. Note, the NHC products are a starting point, but
FLEE can be extended to include additional or more complex information about the storm
and forecasts and warnings, if desired. In this article, NHC forecast products are obtained
for Hurricanes Irma (2017) and Dorian (2019), which represent forecast scenarios with
different tracks, speeds, forecast errors, and subsequently, different evacuation
behaviors (e.g., Wong et al. 2018, Mongold et al. 2020; Long et al. 2020).
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Observed storm characteristics

Archived NHC products where the data are
located

Observed wind radii (i.e., 64, 50, and 34 knot Advisory Wind Field
wind speeds in each of 4 quadrants)
Observed maximum sustained winds (i.e., Advisory Forecast Track
current storm category)
Observed forward speed

Advisory Forecast Track

Table 1: Observed storm characteristics used in FLEE and the NHC products from which the data are
located. Storm characteristics includes the storm’s observed location, size, intensity, and forward speed as
it moves across the virtual world (left). This information was taken from archived NHC forecast products
(right) which were issued in real time (available at https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/gis/). Consistent with the wind
speeds in the NHC data, winds are discussed here in the unit knots (nautical miles per hour, equivalent to
approximately 1.15 mph or 1.85 km/h).
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Forecast information

Archived NHC products where the data are
located

Forecast track

Advisory Forecast Track

Forecast maximum sustained winds (i.e., Advisory Wind Field
forecast storm category)
Forecast wind radii (i.e., 64, 50, and 34 knot Forecast Wind Radii
wind speeds in each of 4 quadrants)
Uncertainty in forecast track

Cone of Uncertainty

Expected arrival time

Arrival time of tropical storm force winds

Table 2: Forecast information used in FLEE and the NHC products from which the data are located. The
forecast information (left) includes the storm’s expected track, category, size, the amount of uncertainty
associated with the forecast track (i.e., the cone of uncertainty), and the expected arrival time of the storm.
Specific archived NHC products where the data was taken is shown (right) and is available for download at
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/gis/. Note: the cone of uncertainty represents the probable track of the center of
a tropical cyclone, and is formed by enclosing the area swept out by a set of circles along the forecast track
(at 12, 24, 36 hours, etc.). The size of each circle is set so that two-thirds of historical official forecast errors
over
a
5-year
sample
fall
within
the
circle
(see
full
explanation
at
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutcone.shtml).

Each time a new forecast is entered into the model, information from the NHC products
is synthesized into a “light system” forecast of the three major hazards known to drive
hurricane evacuation decisions: wind, storm surge1, and rain. The approach resembles
the Meteoalarm web platform (http://www.meteoalarm.eu) where hazard risk are
displayed in traffic-light color-coding (green, yellow, orange, red). Reds are reserved for
severe and rare events, while also capturing some degree of immanency (i.e., reds are
warnings, yellows are watches) (Alfieri et al. 2012). We chose to use this type of light
system in the modeling system because it (1) represents a synthesis of the forecast for

1

Storm surge is defined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) as the abnormal
rise in seawater level during a storm, measured as the height of the water above the normal predicted
astronomical tide. The surge is caused primarily by a storm’s winds pushing water onshore.
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public consumption like TV personnel do (Demuth et al. 2009), and (2) provides means
to connect forecast products with the model grid where evacuation decisions are made
(Figure 1b).
Light system forecasts are created with ArcGIS by overlaying products onto the 10 x 4
model grid. Then, at each grid cell, forecast products are combined and weighted to
estimate risk for wind, surge, and rain. Weights are based on current knowledge of the
contributions of different factors to these types of hazards (e.g., Rezapour and Baldock
2014; NOAA 2021; team expertise in meteorology and risk perception), combined with an
empirical validation that the progression of hazard risks for Irma and Dorian is reasonable.
Sensitivity tests on the light system weighting (not shown) indicated that shifts in the
weightings of the different factors did not have a significant effect on evacuations. The
exact process of combining and weighting information to create light system forecasts is
provided in Tables A1–A3.
Figure 2 presents the light system forecasts for Hurricane Irma (2017) at 24 hour intervals.
The early NHC forecasts depict the most likely scenario as a landfalling major hurricane
near Miami. However, the forecasts shifted westward as the storm approached Florida,
with the storm eventually making one mainland U.S. landfall in the Florida Keys and a
second in southwest Florida near Naples. The light system captures the gradual westward
shift in threats. Moreover, as the storm approaches Florida and track uncertainty
decreases (confidence increases), the light system estimates increased risk focused on
areas inside the narrowing cone of uncertainty. Because of these features, the light
system appears to be a reasonable way of representing the risks associated with
hurricane hazards and is good enough to proceed. As a result, FLEE becomes the first
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to use synthesized NHC products with ABMs, and alongside Watts et al. (2019) and
Morss et al. (2017), contains one of the most sophisticated representations of hurricane
forecast information in models of the hurricane evacuation system to date.

Figure 2: Light system forecasts for Hurricane Irma (2017) as the storm approaches and travels through
the Florida-like, model grid. Forecasts are shown at 24 hour intervals, but update every 6 hours in the model
simulations (not shown). Left column: Evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category (numbers),
cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink), and 64+
(red) knot intervals. Right three columns: The light-system threats for wind, surge, and rain are shown for
equivalent times in the simulation, with the forecast track (center black line) and cone of uncertainty (outer
black lines) included for reference. Note: threats are highest when near the center of the forecast cone and
when hazards are most imminent, among other factors.
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2.3.The human system (information flow, evacuation-related decisions)
With the synthesized light system forecasts as inputs, an ABM simulates the “human
system” i.e., information flow and evacuation-related decisions (Figure 1b). This system
includes two types of agents: emergency management agents who issue evacuation
orders, and household agents (i.e., the public) who collect information, assess risks, and
make protective decisions. An overview of the agents and their decision-making
algorithms, which run every 30 minutes in FLEE, is described in this section.
As the hurricane approaches the coastline, emergency management agents (EMs)
decide whether to issue evacuation orders for each grid cell. The decision-making
process is represented schematically in Figure 3 and is based on research by Demuth et
al. (2012), Dye et al. (2014), and Bostrom et al. (2016), as well as the analysis in Cutter
(2019). Clearance times are subjectively assigned to FLEE’s grid cells using data from
the Florida Statewide Regional Evacuation Study Program (2019) which accounts for
available road networks and the number expected to evacuate per county (based on
population density and forecast intensity). For example, high clearance times (40–60
hours) are located in Miami and Tampa Bay for intense (red) surge forecasts; low
clearance times (5–20 hours) occur in rural areas upstate with less intense (yellow) surge
forecasts. Since surge is not expected inland, only coastal EMs issue evacuation orders
in FLEE.
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Figure 3: The evacuation order decision-making algorithm prescribed to emergency management
agents (EMs) along the coastline. Information used by EMs include the surge light system forecasts
(Section 2.2), estimated arrival time of the storm, and clearance times for each grid cell.

The second type of agent, household agents, represent groups of 4 individuals, bringing
the number of estimated households in FLEE to 4.1 million (note: the literature suggests
people generally make household-based evacuation decisions e.g., summary in MurrayTuite et al. 2019). This is a simplification to reduce model run-time, as the average
household size in Florida is estimated at 2.7. Since the paper’s goals are to describe
FLEE and demonstrate its capabilities, we believe this assumption is okay, for now.
Future experiments building fundamental knowledge of the system dynamics should
accurately reflect household size.

Household agents collect information about the hurricane, assess risk posed by the
storm, and decide whether the risk warrants evacuation. The design of the evacuation
decision-making algorithms prescribed to these agents was adapted from conceptual
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models of protective decision-making for hazards, such as the Protective Action Decision
Model (PADM; Lindell and Perry, 2012; see hurricane applications in Lazo et al. 2015;
Huang et al. 2017; Watts et al. 2019), and findings from empirical research on decisionmaking for hurricanes (e.g., Baker, 1991; Dow and Cutter, 2000; Dash and Gladwin,
2007; Morss and Hayden, 2010; Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang et al., 2016, Morss et
al., 2016, Demuth et al., 2016; Cuite et al., 2017; Bostrom et al., 2018; Demuth et al.,
2018). As noted in Watts et al (2019), a major challenge is to synthesize the conceptual
PADM model and information from empirical analyses into simple yet sufficiently specific
instructions for agents. For the purposes of our model, we are not seeking a fully realistic
algorithm, but one that captures the main processes underlying public evacuation
decisions in the context of the modeling system so we can examine the broader
evacuation dynamics holistically.
To develop the household decision algorithm, we synthesized the relevant literature which
suggests that people generally evacuate when they believe that the hurricane poses a
risk to themselves or their family, and that different people perceive risk differently and
have different evacuation barriers (e.g., Baker, 1991; Dash and Gladwin, 2007; Lazo et
al., 2015). This literature also finds that factors with the strongest, most consistent
influence on evacuation decisions include the risks indicated by forecast information and
evacuation orders, as well as household characteristics associated with risk perceptions
and evacuation barriers (Huang et al. 2016). Thus, we construct the decision-making
algorithms by combining time-varying information about the evolving risk (from light
system forecasts and EM’s evacuation orders) and household characteristics related to
perceived and actual risk (age, mobile home residence) to form a risk assessment. This
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risk assessment is then compared with evacuation barriers (socioeconomic status, car
ownership) which vary across the agent population and the model grid. Undecided agents
seek information and update decisions every 30 minutes, making agents active
participants in the evacuation decision making process (Watts et al. 2019; Morss et al.
2017; Mileti and Sorensen 1990, Sadri et al. 2017). A high-level schematic of the decisionmaking algorithm is presented in Figure 4; details regarding the algorithm’s variables and
formulation is provided in Table A4.

Figure 4: The household evacuation decision-making algorithm in FLEE. Based on the PADM of
Lindell and Perry (2012), the process begins when agents combine information obtained from multiple
sources (e.g., forecast information, evacuation orders, and household characteristics) into a household risk
assessment, which is then compared with evacuation barriers (i.e., socioeconomic barriers, car ownership)
that vary across the agent population. A household will evacuate if the household’s risk assessment is
greater than the household’s evacuation barriers.
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Agent’s household characteristics are prescribed by subjectively projecting county-level
census and social vulnerability data regarding mobile home ownership, age, car
ownership, and socioeconomic status (which includes poverty rates, unemployment, and
income) onto FLEE’s model grid (Figure A1; Flanagan et al. 2011). Once the geographical
distribution of variables is sorted between cells, specific characteristics are stochastically
assigned to individual households (Table A5). The idea is to not perfectly represent the
real-world characteristics, but to generally capture its geographical distribution, and have
an appropriately wide range of household characteristics within grid cells. This results in
many heterogeneous agents with unique preferences and characteristics.
To account for complexities in how people process and value different information, factors
influencing a household’s risk assessment are weighed differently between households
(Table A6). For example, some agents are concerned about evacuation orders while
others are not; some are concerned about their mobile home’s durability while others are
not, and so on. Varying the weights captures these differences. In addition, varying the
weights indirectly represents other factors such as culture and worldviews which are
sometimes important (Lazrus et al. 2020; Morss et al. 2020). Weight distributions are
stochastically generated for each household with specified ranges informed by the
literature (e.g., Senkbeil et al. 2019; Bostrom et al. 2018; Petrolia et al. 2011; Meyer et al.
2014; Morss and Hayden 2010; Brommer and Senkbeil 2010; Peacock et al. 2005). The
idea is to reflect the relative importance of each factor (e.g., evacuation orders, forecast
information, mobile home ownership, and age, in that order) as established in Huang et
al. (2016).
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One noteworthy simplification of the decision-making algorithm is that households do not
share forecast information with other agents. In other words, everyone has the exact
same forecast and evacuation order information i.e., it is a world with perfect,
instantaneous communication of updated forecast information. Another is that they do not
consider social cues, such as seeing other people evacuate, which can increase one’s
risk perception. We also do not consider previous experience of disasters, social-media
influence, or the structural integrity of buildings, which can influence people’s risk
assessments and behaviors (e.g., Dash and Gladwin, 2007; Lindell and Perry, 2012;
Demuth et al., 2018). Again, the idea is to capture the main processes underlying public
evacuation decisions so we can examine the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system
dynamics holistically. Such features could be added in future model versions, depending
on the intended research goals.
2.4 The built environment (infrastructure, evacuation routing, and traffic)
If a household decides to evacuate, they enter another ABM – this time representing
evacuation traffic – which moves the household across an idealized road network toward
a (presumably) safer location (Figure 1c). An overview of this traffic model, its vehicle
agents, and the idealized road infrastructure is described in this section.
FLEE’s idealized road network, and its relationship with the 10 x 4 model grid, is depicted
in Figure 5. The built environment consists of two five-lane interstates (blue arrows)
situated on the edges of the model grid. These interstates, representing Florida’s I-75 and
I-95, transport evacuees northward along FLEE’s “coasts.” Additionally, two east-west
running, three-lane interstates (purple arrows), representing Florida’s I-75 and I-4, allow
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residents to move horizontally across the grid. For example, these interstates let
households move from Miami (yellow star) towards Tampa Bay (blue star) or inland
towards Orlando (orange star). Lastly, eight, two-lane highways (red arrows) allow inland
residents access to the interstates where they can flee northward/inland to safety. Though
idealized, FLEE’s built infrastructure is designed to capture the main elements of Florida’s
real world road network that influence large-scale evacuation dynamics. However, future
models could add complex road structures, such as including local and intra-city road
networks, if desired.

Figure 5: The idealized road network and population distribution on the model grid. Agents inside the
idealized grid (a) are subjectively populated and characterized based on 2019 census data (color filled
cells). Note there are 16,390,000 agents total, which equates to 4,097,500 households/vehicles, and that
grid cell dimensions are 69 x 69 km each. Major cities depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star),
Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando (orange star). The grid cell
corresponding to Tampa Bay (blue star) contains the most evacuees of any grid cell at 2.5 million. Cities
are also depicted in Florida’s actual population map (b), with the semi-transparent, 10 x 4 model grid
overlaid, for reference. The available road network (e.g., road type, direction, number of lanes) is shown
(left) with supporting table (c). Agents are generally instructed to flee onto the primary interstates (blue) and
then northward (arrows) to areas of lower risk.
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Evacuating households are instructed to depart within twelve hours of the evacuation
decision (Huang et al. 2012, Lindell et al. 2005, Murray-Tuite et al. 2019). Departure times
are generated stochastically within this twelve hour timeframe. When it’s time to depart,
households are assigned a vehicle and look for spots on the nearest highway (Figure 5;
red and purple lines). Specifically, households search for any unoccupied spot along the
69 km stretch of highway corresponding to their home grid cell. If an open spot exists,
they are immediately placed in this spot. If spots are unavailable due to traffic for a period
of time, evacuees can lose patience, abandon the evacuation and shelter in-place instead
(this process is detailed in Table A7). In this way, the amount of evacuation traffic
influence evacuation decision-making for households.
In regard to destinations, nearly half of the evacuees are randomly selected to evacuate
out-of-state (e.g., based on Wong et al. 2018; Murray-Tuite et al. 2019). For the remaining
in-state evacuees, evacuation destinations are chosen based on where the forecast
hazard risk is lower (e.g., from red to green) and where accommodations are available,
which is typically in more populated areas (Murray-Tuite et al. 2019). In the case of
Hurricane Irma, in-state evacuees typically moved upstate (e.g., towards Tampa Bay,
Jacksonville) and inland (e.g., towards Orlando). Carless households move to local
shelters, meaning they do enter the road networks and influence traffic (Wong et al. 2018).
Regarding route selection, we simplify the complex process by assigning agents the
shortest route (Sadri et al. 2014). Once assigned, evacuee routes do not change. The
amount of time required to reach destinations is not considered, though this could be
added in future models.
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For those who enter the road, rules governing vehicle movement are simple: drivers
accelerate when they can, slow down if they must, and do not accelerate at the speed
limit (70 mph on interstates, 50 mph on roads) or behind another car. Lane switching is
not permitted but could be added in future models. Some drivers exhibit erratic behaviors
by randomly braking, potentially leading to traffic jams. Accidents are stochastically
generated, with a frequency based on Robinson et al. (2009). Default settings for these
parameters are described in Table A7.
An example of FLEE’s evacuation traffic is shown in Figure 6. The traffic model, which
has a 1.2 second timestep, captures interactions between vehicles at micro-scales, e.g.,
over-reactive and/or erratic drivers cause other drivers to slow down, triggering realisticlooking traffic jams (Figure 6; blue streaks). These interactions are important for
investigating complex system dynamics such as traffic (Miller and Page 2007; Barton
2014). Congestion and slowdowns – similar to what is shown in Figure 6 – occur at
intersections, in densely populated regions, surrounding accidents, or when vehicles run
out of gas. In Section 4.1, we show that, before Hurricane Irma, severe traffic occurs
along I-75 and I-95 northbound due to Miami and Tampa Bay being in the storm’s path.
During Irma’s actual evacuation, severe traffic was also observed in these areas (e.g.,
Zhu et al., 2020; Cava 2018; Wong et al. 2018). Because the traffic model captures
important vehicle interactions at microscales, and generates reasonable traffic
phenomena at regional scales, we believe FLEE’s built environment represents
evacuation traffic sufficiently well to examine the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system
dynamics holistically.
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Figure 6: Sample of evacuation traffic generated by FLEE’s built environment during Hurricane Irma
(2017). Specifically, we show one lane of a zoomed-in, 4-km segment of I-95 (y-axis). Vehicles (dots) move
along the interstate segment over a 5-minute period (x-axis) (i.e., vehicles move from bottom-left to topright). Colors depict vehicle speed – full speed traffic moves unobstructed (red dots), while erratic drivers
cause vehicles to slow down (blue dots) or stop altogether (dark blue).

3. Experimental methods and data analysis
3.1 Model validation
There are no governing equations to model human behavior. Therefore a thorough
understanding of the FLEE’s behavior – and a validation the behavior is realistic as
possible – must be achieved. This was accomplished in several ways. First, the modeling
framework was tested throughout implementation to ensure the model code is error-free.
This includes conducting sensitivity analyses on FLEE i.e., components were perturbed,
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one-by-one, to check if it behaves reasonably (e.g., sensitivity tests on light system
weights described in Section 2.2). Second, the model framework was calibrated against
existing observational data, namely for Hurricane Irma (e.g., Wong et al. 2018; FDEM
2017; Long et al. 2020; Feng and Lin 2021). These empirical studies provide an overview
of Irma’s evacuation behaviors, including the total number of evacuees, how Irma’s
evacuation rates change with time and vary spatially, and when/where significant traffic
occurred. Throughout Section 4, we compare FLEE’s default evacuation behaviors to
these observations in an effort to validate the model framework, and in turn, demonstrate
that FLEE portrays key aspects of real-world evacuation dynamics sufficiently well to be
suitable for experimentation.
3.2 Experimental Design
Table 3 provides an overview of the different experiments reported in this article. The first
experiment (Table 3a) uses the default model parameters described in Section 2.1–2.4
for Hurricane Irma. It provides a baseline of evacuation behaviors which are compared to
existing observational data for validation. Based on this default simulation, we then
systematically modify model parameters one-by-one, while holding other variables
constant, to explore FLEE’s behaviors and sensitivities. These experiments include
varying the evacuation order timing (Table 3b), implementing contraflow (Table 3c), and
changing the storm to Hurricane Dorian (Table 3d). Additional experiments changing the
evacuation decision-making inputs (Table 3e) and the population density (Table 3f) are
included in Appendix A. Together, these proof-of-concept experiments are intended to
demonstrate how FLEE can serve as a virtual laboratory uniquely positioned to advance
our understanding of the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system.
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Experiment

Storm

Goal

Run details

a) Default

Irma

Establish a baseline of
evacuation behaviors (section
4.1) for comparison with
experiments b-f and
observational data for
validation.

1: Inputs described in Sections
2.1-2.4.

b) Varying
evacuation
order timing

Irma

Examine the influence of
changing evacuation order
timing by adjusting clearance
times at each grid cell (section
4.2)

2: Evacuation orders 10 h earlier
3: Evacuation orders 10 h later
4: Clearance times equal
5: Clearance times equal and
reduced by 10 hours

c)
Implementing
contraflow

Irma

Examine the influence of
contraflow on evacuations
(section 4.3) by adjusting the
number lanes on various
highways

6: +1 lane on I-95
7: +1 lane on I-75
8: +1 lane on both I-95/I-75

d) Default

Dorian To examine how the default
parameter values carry over to
a new storm scenario (section
4.4)

e) Evacuation
decisionmaking inputs

Irma

Determine the relative influence
of each decision-making input
by turning them off, one-by-one
(Appendix A)

10: Forecast weight = 0
11: Evacuation order weight = 0
12: Age weight = 0
13: Mobile home weight = 0

f) Varying
population
density

Irma

Adjust population distribution to
examine the influence of
population density on
evacuations (Appendix A)

14: Uniform population
distribution

9: Default inputs (Sections 2.12.4) but with Dorian’s light
system forecasts

Table 3: Description of experiments. The main goals are to establish the broader spatial and temporal
patterns of evacuation behaviors for Hurricane Irma (2017), then intentionally perturb FLEE’s key
parameters to assess the relative importance and general response of the factors (b-f). In doing so, we
demonstrate how FLEE can investigate the dynamics of the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system. Note:
experiments e and f were included in Appendix A.
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3.3 Data Analysis
To compare evacuation patterns and behaviors quantitatively across simulations, FLEE
tracks evacuation statistics for all grid cells. The primary model output analyzed here are
the percent of households that successfully evacuated (i.e., evacuation rates), and the
percent who intended to evacuate but “gave up” due to traffic. The latter statistic provides
insight to where the excessive traffic may be preventing successful evacuations. In
addition to displaying data by grid cells, values are broken down into multiple impact
zones, designed as first-order approximations of areas likely to experience different levels
of impacts based on the actual meteorological conditions produced by the storm. Here,
we use four impact zones, defined by whether the grid cells: a) are coastal or inland, and
b) primarily experiences winds that are greater than 64 knots (hurricane-force) or less
than 64 knots. Using the impact zones, we can determine who evacuated from locations
that did not end up experiencing hazardous conditions. In addition, we examine
compliance rates (i.e., the percentage of residents under evacuation orders who
evacuated) and shadow evacuation rates (i.e., the percentage of residents who
evacuated from areas not under evacuation orders; McGhee and Grimes 2006; MurrayTuite et al. 2019). Note: evacuation orders are issued for entire grid cells i.e., everyone in
that grid cell either gets an evacuation order or not.
In looking at the results, we compare multiple metrics that might indicate successful
outcomes in different ways. For example, high compliance rates may not be “good” if the
storm ends up not having much impact in those areas, and shadow evacuation rates may
not matter if those at highest risk can get out safely.
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Because FLEE includes stochastic elements, it can exhibit some run-to-run variability.
For example, in a series of tests where simulations were repeated five times, evacuation
rates ranged from 0–2% within grid cells. This run-to-run variability is smaller than other
agent-based evacuation simulations (e.g., Watts et al. 2019, Chen and Zhan 2008), likely
because

there

are

many

more

agents

in

this

model

(nearly

4.1

million

households/vehicles). Nevertheless, when interpreting results, changes less than this 0–
2% variability within grid cells are considered insignificant.
4. Results
4.1 Spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation
First, we examine results from a simulation with the default FLEE configuration for
Hurricane Irma (Table 3a). By comparing these results with observations of Irma’s actual
evacuation (e.g., in Wong et al. 2018; FDEM 2017; Long et al. 2020; Feng and Lin 2021),
they provide a first-order assessment that agents in the model are behaving reasonably
based on the processes implemented. They also illustrate key aspects of FLEE’s
behavior, including the spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation, which provide a
baseline for interpreting results from subsequent experiments (sections 4.2–4.4;
Appendix A, supplementary results 1–2).
Based on the default model settings for Irma, EM agents issue evacuation orders in a
similar pattern to what was observed (Figure 7; red cells). Evacuation orders were first
issued around Miami-Ft. Lauderdale 36–48 hours into the simulation (Figure 7b), and
spread northward along both coastlines over the next several days (Figure 7c–e). The
last evacuation orders were issued in Jacksonville 120 hours into the simulation, which
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coincides with the time Irma makes landfall along the southwest Florida coast (Figure 7e).
By the end of the simulation, Irma’s hurricane-force winds (Figure 7f–g; dotted cells)
impacted the western two-thirds of the model – particularly the southwest and western
coastlines – while leaving the east-coast generally unscathed. This general progression
of evacuation orders being issued from south-to-north along both coasts matches what
occurred with Irma (e.g., see Page 14-15 and Figure 2 of Wong et al. 2018 for evacuation
orders by county). This increases our confidence that the EM decision-making algorithm
– and the storm surge forecasts on which its based – behaves reasonably and
realistically.
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Figure 7: Evacuation rates in Irma’s default model run. Rates are presented every 24 hours throughout
the 144 hour simulation (a-f) for each grid cell. The percentage which intended to evacuate but could not
due to excessive traffic is also expressed (g), as are the spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation orders
(red cells) and the swath of hurricane force winds experienced (dotted cells). Also shown are the number
of evacuees still enroute (bottom of panels a-f) and the population by grid cell (h). Major cities depicted
include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star),
and Orlando (orange star). These provide a frame of reference for the evacuation rates in a-f.

The percentage of households who evacuate is shown at 24 hour intervals for each grid
cell (Figure 7 a–f). The results depict spatial and temporal patterns that are similar to real
hurricane evacuation behaviors. First, evacuation rates increase after evacuation orders
are issued, showing its importance to decision-making (Huang et al. 2016). Secondly and
relatedly, evacuation rates are higher along the coasts than inland (Baker 1991). Thirdly,
evacuation rates are still high for most areas. This arises because the forecasts in this
simulation were dire everywhere, especially before the storm’s track shifted westward
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(Figure 2). The dire forecasts prompted EMs to issue evacuation orders along both
coasts, and as a result, many agents evacuated areas which did not experience hurricane
force winds.
FLEE’s simulated evacuation rates generally match existing observational data for Irma,
which suggest evacuation rates vary from 40–60% along Florida’s east coast, to 60-80%
across the south and west coasts, and around 5-40% inland (e.g., see breakdown of
evacuation rates by region in Figure 4 of Wong et al. 2018; breakdown by voting precinct
in Figure 1c of Long et al. 2020). One area for improvement is that FLEE produces
evacuation rates higher than realistic early in the simulation, especially in the northern
part of Florida (Long et al. 2020).
Table 4 depicts evacuation rates in different impact zones. In total, 45.1% of households
on the model grid evacuate, which equals 7.38 million people. Note, estimates from the
Florida Department of Emergency Management (2017) suggest actual evacuation
numbers totaled 6.9 million. For a given level of wind impact, evacuation rates are higher
along the coasts than inland (52.3% coastal vs. 22.2% inland for >64 knots, 58.1% coastal
vs. 36.7% inland for <64 knots). Interestingly, areas experiencing hurricane force winds
had lower evacuation rates than areas less affected by the storm. This could be due to
the potentially higher than realistic evacuation rates early in the simulation. They may
also partially result from the east coast receiving evacuation orders, albeit unnecessarily,
which increased evacuation rates in these areas, combined with excessive traffic along
the west coast. For example, 17 to 32% of the populated Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg gave
up evacuating due to excessive traffic (Figure 7g). The severe congestion, which did
occur with Irma’s actual evacuation, also reduced evacuation rates along the southwest
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and southeast coasts (e.g., see traffic information in Page 15 of Wong et al. 2018; FDEM
2017; Feng and Lin 2021).
% Successfully evacuated

Experiment

Total Coastal Inland
(all
>64
>64
cells) knot
knot
zone
zone

Coastal
< 64
knot
zone

Inland Compliance Shadow
Gave
< 64
rates
evacuation up to
knot
traffic
zone

Irma Default

45.1

58.1

36.7

52.3

22.2

55.0

25.6

10.5

Table 4: Evacuation rates by impact zones for Irma’s default run. Successful evacuation rates are
broken down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing vs. not experiencing hurricane
force winds of 64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate via evacuation order who did
evacuate), shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed to evacuate who did), and
the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to excessive amounts of traffic.

A second pattern illustrated by the evacuation rates is the variability in evacuation
decisions among households i.e., some households decide to leave, but many do not,
despite seeing similar information and having similar characteristics. This is consistent
with real-world hurricane evacuations, and more generally with the heterogeneity
exhibited by US households in the real-world (e.g., Hasan et al., 2011; Dixon et al., 2017).
In the model, the variability arises from household’s different weighting of information as
well as their different characteristics and barriers, which create differences in household
risk perception.
Figure 8 illustrates the temporal evacuation patterns. Despite not receiving evacuation
orders, many households (black dotted line) evacuate in the first 0–36 hours. Evacuation
rates increase linearly between 36–108 hours as evacuation orders expand along the
coasts. Just before the storm moves ashore around 126 hours, evacuation rates
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decrease, while the number of households giving up due to excessive traffic (black
dashed line) increase. The latter occurs as household agents’ patience is influenced by
the forecast arrival time of the storm. In other words, agents see the impending landfall,
then decide to abandon the evacuation and stay home. These temporal patterns of
evacuations, as with the spatial patterns, generally match existing empirical data, which
suggests that evacuation rates increased semi-linearly throughout this period (e.g., see
Figure 6 of Wong et al. 2018; Figure 2c of Long et al. 2020). As a result, we believe
FLEE’s simulated evacuations provide a realistic baseline for interpreting results from
subsequent experiments (sections 4.2–4.4).

Figure 8: The temporal patterns in evacuation for Irma’s default simulation. Successful evacuation
rates are shown (black dotted line), averaged across all grid cells, as are the percentage of households
giving up due to traffic (dashed line), the percent staying and/or undecided (solid black line), and the
percentage of households moving to a local shelter (grey dot dashed line). The latter do not officially enter
the road network. Key times in the evacuation simulation, such as evacuation order issuance and storm’s
landfall, are indicated by the vertical dotted lines. The results illustrate key aspects of the model’s behavior
and provide a starting point for interpreting results from subsequent experiments (sections 4.2–4.4).
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4.2 Varying timing of evacuation orders
Now we investigate the effects of changing the evacuation order timing in FLEE (Table
3b). Specifically, we conduct four experiments: 1) shifting evacuation orders 10 hours
earlier, 2) shifting evacuation orders 10 hours later, 3) equalizing the clearance times for
all grid cells, making the storm’s forecasted arrival time the only factor influencing
differences in evacuation order timing across grid cells, and 4) shifting evacuation orders
10 hours earlier than in experiment 3. These experiments build on the results examined
in section 4.1, and begin to explore interactions among the evolving forecasts, evacuation
orders, and household evacuation behaviors.
Evacuation rates, broken down by impact zones (Table 5), indicate that changing
evacuation order timing in the four experiments reduces the overall evacuation rates from
45.1% in Irma’s default simulation (top row) to 43.3 – 44.6%, which is 295,200 – 82,000
less evacuees. Similarly, rates of evacuees giving up to traffic increases from 10.5% in
the default simulation to 10.9 – 13.0%, which is 65,600 and 410,00 more people. This is
surprising, as one might expect evacuation rates to increase if evacuation orders are
issued earlier, as this creates more time to evacuate.
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% Successfully evacuated
Experiment

Total Coastal
(all
>64
cells) knot
zone

Inland
>64
knot
zone

Coastal
< 64
knot
zone

Inland Compliance Shadow
Gave
< 64
rates
evacuation up to
knot
traffic
zone

Irma Default

45.1

52.3

22.2

58.1

36.7

55.0

25.6

10.5

EO +10h

44.6

51.5

20.9

56.2

36.9

53.6

24.7

11.8

EO -10h

43.9

51.7

23.7

51.5

36.8

49.9

30.5

10.9

CTs equal

43.6

51.7

22.4

51.6

37.0

51.6

25.9

12.8

CTs equal,
reduced 10h

43.3

50.4

22.8

51.7

36.8

51.0

26.1

13.0

Table 5: Experiments varying evacuation order EO timing. Successful evacuation rates are broken
down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing vs. not experiencing hurricane force
winds of 64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate via evacuation order who did
evacuate), shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed to evacuate who did), and
the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to excessive amounts of traffic.
Note: EO is short for evacuation orders; CT is short for clearance times. Irma’s default model run is included
for reference.

When examining the results for every grid cell (Figure 9), results indicate that, despite
only affecting evacuation rates by 1–2% overall, changing the evacuation order timing
has significant and sometimes opposite effects between neighboring areas. For example,
shifting evacuation orders 10 hours earlier (Figure 9a) increases evacuation rates (and
decreases traffic) in Tampa Bay–St. Petersburg by 4%, while decreasing evacuation rates
(and increase traffic) from 2% to 16% in neighboring cells to the south. This points to the
importance of coordination amongst EMs for issuing evacuation orders within a region
and a need for follow-up experiments to unpack these complex processes.
Shifting evacuation orders 10 hours later (Figure 9b) across all grid cells results in
evacuation orders not being issued in the Jacksonville metropolitan area. This is because,
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during the additional 10 hours where EMs are deciding whether to issue evacuation
orders, the forecast shifted westward and away from Jacksonville (Figure 2), thus
prompting EMs to decide against issuing evacuation orders for the area. These results
demonstrate how the model captures the real-world tradeoffs between issuing evacuation
orders earlier (when the uncertainty is greater) versus waiting until closer to the storm’s
arrival (when the forecast uncertainty is reduced).
Figure 9c and Figure 9d show results from experiments where clearance times are
equalized. Recall that clearance times is meant to account for differences in available
road networks and the number expected to evacuate e.g., clearance times are highest in
populated metropolitan areas and in south Florida where people travel longer distances
to evacuate. Thus, equalizing the clearance times, which makes the storm’s arrival time
the only influence on evacuation order timing, is meant to demonstrate the importance of
clearance times in EM decisions. The experiments produce a slight increase in
evacuation rates for Tampa Bay–St. Petersburg (1-4%) but with a general decrease in
evacuation rates everywhere else. This is especially true in Miami, where evacuation
rates drop by 10 to 18%. In this experiment overall, removing the default clearance times
worsened hurricane evacuations by 1–2% in total, which is a decrease of 164,000–
328,000 evacuees (Table 5). This demonstrates how evacuations can be made more
successful by accounting for clearance times in EM’s evacuation order decision-making.
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Figure 9: Effects of EO timing on evacuations across grid cells. Results are presented for the
experiments modifying the timing of evacuation orders, specifically by a) shifting evacuation orders 10 h
earlier than default, b) shifting evacuation orders 10 h later than default, c) equalizing the clearance times,
making the storm’s arrival time the only influence on evacuation order timing, causing evacuation orders to
be issued linearly from south to north as the storm approaches, and d) reducing clearance times by 10
hours than in experiment c. Values are expressed as the departure from the default settings in section 4.1
and in Figure 7f. Also expressed is the swath of hurricane force winds (dotted cells), evacuation orders (red
cells), and the population by grid cell (e). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted
include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star),
and Orlando (orange star). Note, run-to-run variability due to stochastic elements in the model ranges from
0–2% in grid cells for both evacuation rates and percent giving up due to traffic. Therefore values of -2 to 2
lie within that variability and should be ignored.

Figure 10 shows the evolution of evacuation rates (and rates giving up due to traffic) with
time for the different experiments. Shifting evacuation orders 10 hours earlier (green lines)
than default (black lines) simply causes evacuation rates to increase earlier in the
simulation, and does not meaningfully change the evacuation “shape” otherwise. Similar
effects are observed with the uniform clearance time experiments (orange/red lines). This
information suggests the model behaves as expected, and in general, the experiments
demonstrate how the model can quantify and explore, in a simplified context, the effects
of varying evacuation order decisions by EMs. This includes simulating the tradeoffs
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between waiting on evacuation orders and its effect on evacuation success, which cannot
be quantified using empirical methods. In addition, the results suggest the modeling
system is capable of exploring the effects of evacuation strategies such as phased
evacuations, which may be helpful to emergency management (Chiu et al. 2008; Chen
and Zhan 2004; Zhang et al. 2014).

Figure 10: Temporal effects of changing evacuation order timing on evacuation rates (solid lines) and
numbers giving up due to traffic (dashed lines), averaged across all grid cells, throughout the 144 hour
simulation. The default simulation (Table 3a; section 4.1) is expressed (black lines), as are experiments
modifying the timing of evacuation orders, specifically by a) shifting evacuation orders 10 h earlier than
default (green lines), b) shifting evacuation orders 10 h later than default (purple lines), c) equalizing the
clearance times, making the storm’s arrival time the only influence on evacuation order timing, causing
evacuation orders to be issued linearly from south to north, and (orange lines) d) shifting evacuation orders
10 hours earlier than in experiment c (red lines).

4.3 Implementing interstate contraflow
Next, we investigate the effects of adding contraflow to lessen evacuation traffic and
improve evacuation rates in FLEE. For the experiments, we add one contraflow lane on
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I-95, one contraflow lane on I-75, and one contraflow lane on both interstates (Figure
3c).
The results in Table 6 suggest adding contraflow lanes does improve evacuation rates
and reduces traffic overall. For example, evacuation rates improve from 45.1% in the
default simulation (top row) to 48.0, 47.6, and 49.8% when adding contraflow onto I-95,
I-75, and both interstates, respectively. This equates to an increase of 475,600, 410,000,
and 770,800 evacuees. Meanwhile, rates giving up from traffic decrease from 10.5% to
6.6–8.3%, which is a decrease of 639,700—360,800 people. The improvements in
evacuation rates – and reduction in traffic – are not limited to particular times in the
simulation; rather the improvements are uniform throughout (Figure 11).

% Successfully evacuated
Experiment

Total Coastal Inland
(all
>64
>64
cells) knot
knot
zone
zone

Coastal
< 64
knot
zone

Inland Compliance Shadow
Gave
< 64
rates
evacuation up to
knot
traffic
zone

Irma Default

45.1

52.3

22.2

58.1

36.7

55.0

25.6

10.5

+1 I-95

48.0

52.3

25.3

62.6

36.9

57.0

28.0

8.3

+1 I-75

47.6

56.8

22.4

58.0

37.0

57.3

25.9

8.8

+1 I-95, I-75

49.8

56.8

25.7

62.5

36.9

59.3

28.4

6.6

Table 6: Evacuations by impact zone when implementing contraflow. Successful evacuation rates are
broken down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing vs. not experiencing hurricane
force winds of 64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate via evacuation order who did
evacuate), shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed to evacuate who did), and
the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to excessive amounts of traffic.
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Figure 11: Temporal effects of implementing contraflow on evacuation rates (solid lines) and numbers
giving up due to traffic (dashed lines), averaged across grid cells, throughout the 144 hour simulation. The
default simulation is expressed (black lines), as are experiments adding one lane of contraflow onto I-95
(green lines), I-75 (purple lines), both I-95 and I-75 (orange lines). The default run for Hurricane Dorian
(Table 3d; Section 4.4) is also expressed (grey lines). Note, Dorian’s simulation extends to 184 hours while
Irma’s ends after 144 hours.

When comparing the impact of the different experiments on various grid cells (Figure 12ad), the targeted effect of contraflow becomes clear. For example, adding contraflow onto
I-95, which is located along the eastern coastline, improves evacuation rates (and
reduces traffic) along the eastern half of the model grid. Adding contraflow onto I-75,
which is found along the western coastline, improves evacuation rates (and reduces
traffic) along the western half of the model grid. These improvements in evacuation rates
are large locally, ranging from 3–14% along the southwest coast and 5–12% along the
southeast coast.
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The results suggests that, if given accurate forecasts, implementing contraflow in the
modeling system reduces traffic and thus increases successful evacuation in targeted
regions, which is what contraflow is designed to do. This provides evidence that the model
can be used to investigate the potential impacts of modifying different parts of the system,
such as implementing contraflow or other evacuation management strategies, and
determine its influence on the hurricane evacuation in its full context (e.g., supporting
studies by Zhang et al. 2014; Dixit and Radwan 2009; Chen 2012; Sbayti and
Mahmassani 2006; Mitchell and Radwan 2006; Chen and Zhan 2004, 2008; Ballard and
Borchardt 2006; Wolshon and Lambert 2004; Fang and Edara 2014; Chiu et al. 2008;
Wolshon 2001; Yi et al. 2017).
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Figure 12: Influence of contraflow for all grid cells. Evacuation rates (left) and the percent of households
unable to evacuate due to traffic (right) are shown. Results are presented for the default experiment without
contraflow (a), when adding one lane of contraflow to I-95 (b), when adding one lane of contraflow on I-75
(c), and when adding one lane of contraflow onto both interstates (d). These results (b-d) are compared to
the default simulation (a) where values are expressed as the percent difference from the default settings
(a). Also expressed is the swath of hurricane force winds (dotted cells), evacuation orders (red cells), and
the population by grid cell (e). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include MiamiFt. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando
(orange star). Note, run-to-run variability due to stochastic elements in the model ranges from 0–2% in grid
cells for both evacuation rates and percent giving up due to traffic. Therefore values of -2 to 2 lie within that
variability and should be ignored.

4.4 Hurricane Dorian
Finally, we explore the modeling system’s behavior when a different scenario, with a
different storm and a different set of evolving forecasts, is simulated. This experiment
(Table 3d), with Hurricane Dorian (2019), uses the same set of parameters as in the
default Irma simulations. This experiment should be of interest to meteorologists and
emergency managers, by exploring how differences in storm characteristics and forecast
information can propagate through the agent-based system and translate into different
patterns in evacuations.
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Figure 13 shows the evolution of Dorian along with the NHC and light system forecasts.
The early forecasts (0–72h into the simulation) predict the most likely scenario as a
landfalling major hurricane along Florida’s east coast. However, the forecasts shift
northward (96–120h), significantly reducing areas under threat. After remaining nearlystationary over the Bahamas (120–144h), the storm re-accelerates northward (>168h)
narrowly missing Florida’s east coast. As with Irma, the light system captures the spatial
and temporal shifts in threats with Dorian. Because of the forecasts, EMs issue
evacuation orders along the central east-coast by 72 hours (Figure 14; red cells). The
evacuation orders spread along the coastline over the next several days, generally
matching what was observed (Roache 2019; Cangialosi 2019).
Compared to Irma, this is a fundamentally different storm with different areas at risk and
less people under evacuation orders. As a result, evacuation rates were less with Dorian
(33.5%) than with Irma (45.1%), which is 2 million less evacuees (Table 7). Similarly,
fewer households give up on evacuating due to traffic with Dorian (6.1%) than Irma
(10.5%). This reduction in evacuation rates in FLEE generally matches existing
observational data for Dorian (Mongold et al. 2020).
During the first 24–72 hours, evacuation rates are increasing everywhere, as most areas
are under threat (Figure 14a-b). As with Irma, we suspect the model is producing
evacuation rates higher than realistic during this period, especially in the northern part of
Florida and inland. However, this observational data (Mongold et al. 2020) is quite limited
and cannot confirm this. Beyond 48 hours, however, evacuation rates only increase along
the eastern-most portions of the grid where evacuation orders are issued (Figure 14c-f).
By the end, the highest evacuation rates occur in areas where you would expect (i.e.,
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along the east coast where risk is highest, and where evacuation orders are issued),
which is consistent with real-world evacuation behaviors (e.g., Baker 1991). With the
exception of the Tampa-Bay–St. Petersburg area where evacuations occurred early in
the simulation, evacuation traffic was primarily confined along the southeast coast (Figure
14h).
The evolution of Dorian’s evacuation rates with time, averaged across the model grid, is
shown in Figure 11 (grey lines). Similar to Irma’s default run (black lines), evacuation
rates during Dorian quickly increase due to the dire initial forecasts. Once the forecasts
shift northward, Dorian’s evacuation rates slows significantly but with some increases due
to the issuance of evacuation orders between 60–120h. The evacuation stops by 140
hours because, at this point, the storm is expected to remain offshore. The results again
suggest that Dorian’s evacuation is, in many respects, different than Irma’s.
Robust empirical data on Dorian’s evacuation rates is not publicly available. However, the
available data (Mongold et al. 2020) suggests the model is, to first order, generating
reasonable evacuation behaviors e.g., it captures the inland versus coastal differences in
evacuations, the correct issuance of evacuation orders, and the prolonged, linear
increases in evacuation rates observed for several days (Mongold et al. 2020). When
combined with the results from Irma (section 4.1), the results provide further evidence
that the model reasonably simulates the integrated hurricane evacuation system, and can
be used to study various storm scenarios, real or imagined. Furthermore, the differences
in the spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation between the two hurricanes confirm the
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importance of forecast information to the evacuation dynamics (Huang et al. 2016; Baker
1991).

Figure 13: Light system forecast for Hurricane Dorian (2019). Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours
but update every 6 hours (not shown). Left column: Evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. Right three columns: The light-system threats for wind, surge, and rain are
shown for equivalent times with the forecast track (center black line) and cone of uncertainty (outer black
lines) included for reference. Note: threats are highest when near the center of the forecast cone and when
hazards are most imminent, among other factors.
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Figure 14: Evacuation rates for grid cells during Dorian (2019). Rates are expressed every 24 hours
(a-g). The percentage of each grid cell which intended to evacuate but could not due to traffic is also
expressed (h), as is the spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation orders (red cells). In addition, the
number of evacuees still enroute at the various times is shown (bottom of panels a-f). Note, the hurricane
force winds (>64kts) did not impact the model grid. Also expressed is the population by grid cell (i) which
provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa
Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando (orange star).
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% Successfully evacuated
Experiment

Total Coastal Inland
(all
>64
>64
cells) knot
knot
zone
zone

Coastal
< 64
knot
zone

Inland Compliance Shadow
Gave
< 64
rates
evacuation up to
knot
traffic
zone

Irma Default

45.1

52.3

22.2

58.1

36.7

55.0

25.6

10.5

Dorian Default

33.5

-

-

67.6

24.8

64.4

23.3

6.1

Table 7: Evacuation behaviors by impact zone for Dorian. Successful evacuation rates are broken down
into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing vs. not experiencing hurricane force winds of
64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate via evacuation order who did evacuate),
shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed to evacuate who did), and the
percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to excessive amounts of traffic.

5. Summary and Discussion
This article conceptualizes and implements a modeling framework for studying the
dynamics of the hurricane-forecast-warning system. The modeling framework, called
FLEE, integrates models of the natural hazard, the human system, the built environment,
and connections between systems. It includes millions of agents – with behaviors and
characteristics informed by empirical research – who interact with each other, with their
physical environments, and with evolving, uncertain forecast information to produce
evacuation decisions and generate evacuation traffic. After describing FLEE, we validate
the model framework by comparing its evacuation behaviors to observations, mainly for
Hurricane Irma (2017), and present a set of proof-of-concept experiments illustrating its
behaviors when key parameters are modified. In doing so, we show FLEE is capable of
examining the dynamics of the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system from a new
perspective.
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We propose several areas for future work. First, FLEE can explore how changes in
forecast track, intensity, storm size, forward speed, uncertainty, and different forecast
scenarios influence evacuations (see, e.g., Fossell et al. 2017). This provides
meteorologists with a societally-relevant alternative to traditional measures of forecast
accuracy (need described by Morss 2005, Murphey 1993, Roebber and Bosart 1996), by
measuring the impact of forecasts elements and uncertainties on how people receive and
process the information, make evacuation decisions, and physically evacuate. Second,
the model can be used to address behavioral science questions, such as how future
projections of population density, socioeconomic status, inequality, and car access may
affect hurricane evacuations. Third, FLEE can further determine the relative effectiveness
of evacuation management strategies such as contraflow, adding public transportation,
evacuation order timing, and phased evacuations (building on, e.g., Urbina and Wolshon
2003, Madireddy et al. 2011) and how forecasts influence evacuation order decisions
(Davidson et al. 2018). This benefits researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in
hazard risk management.
FLEE is intentionally abstracted to explore the broader evacuation dynamics. However,
additional layers of complexity can be added, depending on research goals e.g., to
account for family composition, social circle's evacuation status, social-media influence,
and house/building strength in evacuation decisions. FLEE can be extended to study
other regions or hazards, such as hurricanes followed by flooding, loss of power networks,
damage to roads, and other cascading failures. Additional in-depth comparisons with
observational data can improve FLEE’s realism, and subsequently, its capability to
answer questions of interest. But given the sparse availability of empirical data on
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hurricane evacuations, new data sets are likely needed. Nevertheless, in its current form,
FLEE can significantly advance our understanding of the integrated hurricane-forecastwarning system. This new knowledge is informed by and feeds back into empirical
research, and can ultimately support researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers in a
variety of disciplines, thereby offering the promise of direct applications to save lives and
mitigate hurricane losses.
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ARTICLE 2
WHAT IMPROVES EVACUATIONS? EXPLORING THE HURRICANE-FORECASTEVACUATION SYSTEM DYNAMICS USING AN AGENT-BASED FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction
In the mainland US, the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system is dynamic, complex, and
difficult to predict, owing to interacting physical-social factors and uncertainties that
change as the storm approaches. Take Hurricane Irma (2017) and Rita (2005), cases
where accurate but uncertain forecasts triggered mass evacuations — and severe traffic
jams — in Florida and Texas, respectively. As the forecasts shifted and traffic worsened,
some evacuees became more exposed to hazardous conditions than had they remained
in-place (Cangialosi et al. 2018; Wong et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2007; Knabb et al. 2006).
Despite forecasts being as accurate as one can expect given current forecast skill, these
cases illustrate the complexities of people using inevitably imperfect information to make
pre-storm evacuation decisions, and they demonstrate how evacuations involve many
intersecting physical-social parts and uncertainties that evolve over time (e.g., Morss et
al. 2017; Barton 2014; Miller and Page 2007; Watts et al. 2019). Because of these
complex dynamics, evacuations are a formidable challenge.
Empirical studies help explain aspects of evacuations, such as how forecasts, warnings,
and other factors influence evacuation decisions (e.g., Huang et al. 2016; Lindell and
Perry 2012; Baker 1991). However, it’s impossible to empirically study all aspects of
evacuation across multiple cases. Computational models, on the other hand, provide a
complementary tool where empirical knowledge can be codified and used to run virtual
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experiments for many hurricane scenarios, real or synthetic (e.g., Morss et al. 2017, Watts
et al. 2019; Harris et al. 2021; Blanton et al. 2018; Davidson et al. 2018). In this context,
modeling studies often optimize evacuations through strategies such as contraflow
(opening additional lanes for traffic), public transportation, and evacuation order timing
(e.g., summary of strategies in Murray-Tuite et al. 2019). However, the full hurricaneforecast-evacuation system — including these different evacuation management
strategies — has not yet been represented in one framework, meaning a holistic
exploration of the system’s dynamics has not been achieved.
To address this need, Harris et al. (2021), which is also Article 1 of this dissertation,
developed a modeling framework capable of exploring the system’s dynamics holistically.
Called FLEE (Forecasting Laboratory for Exploring the Evacuation-system), the agentbased framework models key aspects of real-world hurricane evacuations: the natural
hazard (hurricane), the human system (information flow, evacuation decisions), the built
environment (road infrastructure), and connections between systems (forecasts and
warning information, traffic, impact zones). By coupling the models into one framework
for the first time, FLEE is capable of simultaneously exploring interactions across these
sub-systems. In the current version, FLEE’s agent-based model grid is a 10 x 4 abstracted
representation of the north-south axis of Florida (e.g., see conceptualization,
implementation, assumptions, and proof-of-concept experiments in Harris et al. 2021).
Note that FLEE is designed to represent key aspects of evacuations established in the
literature, while remaining sufficiently idealized to build fundamental and practical
knowledge (e.g., see Watts et al. 2019; Sun et al. 2016, discussion in Section 2). As a
result, it is capable of providing a high-level, first-order look at the system’s dynamics.
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This paper’s objective is to begin exploring the system’s dynamics using FLEE.
Specifically, through sensitivity analyses on the model, we assess how evacuations
change with evacuation management strategies and policies (public transportation,
contraflow, evacuation order timing), evolving population characteristics (population
growth, urbanization), and forecast scenarios impacting the Florida peninsula (Irma,
Dorian, rapid-onset version of Irma). Throughout the analysis, we ask:
1) How do the factors impact evacuation success?
2) How does the factor’s impact vary across forecast-population scenarios?
3) How are the impacts distributed geographically?
In answering these questions, we demonstrate how these agent-based, computational
frameworks can build our understanding of evacuations across many different real and
imagined scenarios. Such knowledge would support researchers, practitioners, and
policy-makers in a variety of disciplines including hazard risk management (building on,
e.g., Madireddy et al. 2011), evacuation modeling (e.g., building on Watts et al. 2017,
Davidson et al. 2018), and meteorology (e.g., need for measures of forecast impacts
described by Morss 2005, Murphy 1993, Roebber and Bosart 1996).
2. Methodology
2.1 Experimental Design
We start by performing a set of experiments with FLEE that involve changing the storm
and corresponding forecast scenarios. To do so, we run FLEE using forecasts from
Hurricane Irma and Dorian, which triggered evacuations across Florida in 2017 and 2019,
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respectively. These simulations were compared to observational evacuation data for
validation (Section 3). We then run FLEE with a hypothetical version of Irma in which
Irma’s forecasts are condensed into a shorter timeframe to assess how rapid onset (and
similarly, rapid intensification) impacts evacuation success. Together, these three
experiments are used to provide a baseline of evacuation behaviors to compare additional
experiments against.
Next, starting from these “default” simulations for each storm, we systematically modify
FLEE’s parameters one-by-one, while holding other variables constant, to explore FLEE’s
behaviors and sensitivities to evacuation management strategies, evacuation policies,
and evolving population characteristics. This includes simulating contraflow by adding
one, two, and three lanes across important highways; public transportation/carpooling by
adjusting the number of evacuees per vehicle from 4 people per car to 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8
people per car; modifications to evacuation order timing by shifting the issuance of
evacuation orders earlier/later by 10 and 20 hours; and the impact of population growth
and urbanization by projecting the population forward to 2030 and 2040 or making
population density uniform across the model grid, respectively. By comparing the
experiments to the default simulations and to each other, we investigate the relative
importance of different factors and key interactions, and we demonstrate how FLEE can
explore the system’s dynamics across a variety of scenarios.
2.2 Data Analyses
To compare evacuation behaviors quantitatively across simulations, we track evacuation
statistics for each of FLEE’s 40 grid cells, which represent the north-south axis of Florida
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(see full description of the model’s virtual world in Harris et al. 2021, hereafter HRM21).
The primary model output analyzed here are the percent of households that successfully
evacuated (i.e., evacuation rates), and the percent who intended to evacuate but gave up
due to traffic. The latter statistic provides insight to where excessive traffic prevented
successful evacuations. In addition to displaying data by grid cells and averaged across
the domain, these two statistics are sometimes broken down into multiple impact zones,
designed as first-order approximations of areas likely to experience different levels of
impacts based on the actual meteorological conditions produced by the storm. Here, we
use four impact zones, defined by whether the grid cells are: a) coastal or inland, and b)
experience winds that are greater than 64 knots (hurricane-force) or less than 64 knots
during the storm of interest. Using the impact zones, we can determine who evacuated
from locations that did not end up experiencing hazardous conditions. In addition, we
examine the percentage of residents under evacuation orders in the model who
evacuated (sometimes called compliance rates), and the percentage of residents who
evacuated from areas not under evacuation orders (sometimes called shadow
evacuations; McGhee and Grimes 2006; Murray-Tuite et al. 2019).
In interpreting the results for different experiments, we compare multiple metrics that
might indicate successful outcomes in different ways. For example, high evacuation rates
may not be “good” if the storm ends up not having much impact in those areas, and
unnecessary evacuations may not matter if those in areas experiencing the greatest
impacts were able to evacuate successfully.
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Because FLEE includes stochastic elements, it can exhibit some run-to-run variability.
Therefore, when interpreting results, changes less than 0–2% in evacuation statistics
across experiments are considered insignificant (e.g., see experiments in HRM21).
2.3 Model Updates and Validation
Based on comparison with recent empirical data on evacuation rates and traffic for the
storms studied here, several updates have been made to FLEE since its
conceptualization and implementation in HRM21. First, to reduce evacuation rates early
in the simulations, making the temporal patterns of evacuation closer to data for Irma and
Dorian, we made two changes: 1) integrating households into the decision-making
process gradually rather than assuming instantaneous communication of risk information
and 2) making evacuation barriers time dependent, i.e., decrease as the storm
approaches. Second, the initial formulation of FLEE exhibited unrealistic variability
between grid cells in some situations; to address this, we reduced the influence of mobile
home and socioeconomic status in the evacuation decision-making algorithm. In addition,
FLEE’s initial formulation overestimated evacuation rates in coastal grid cells compared
to inland cells. Thus, we changed the formulation of evacuation orders so they are only
issued to a percentage of households in coastal grid cells, reflecting the approximate
percentage of population in different regions of Florida that live in evacuation zones,
rather than the entire grid cell. Details regarding the implementation of the updates is
provided in the Appendix B (Table B1, Figure B1), as are full descriptions and sources of
the empirical data used for validation (Table B2).
3. Results and Discussion
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First, we examine results from the default simulations for Hurricane’s Irma and Dorian.
Comparing these simulations against observations provides a first-order assessment that
the model behaves reasonably for these two forecast scenarios based on the processes
implemented. Then, we examine results from the default simulation using forecasts from
a rapid-onset version of Irma (hereafter called Irma-RO). Together, the experiments
provide a baseline for interpreting results from subsequent experiments.
3.1 Hurricane Irma
Irma’s 3-10–day forecasts, as shown in Figure 2 of HRM21 (Article 1 of this dissertation),
place the entire model under significant threat, with the most likely outcome being a
landfalling major hurricane near Miami. However, forecasts shifted westward as the storm
approached, with the storm eventually making a first mainland U.S. landfall as a Category
4 in the Florida Keys and a second landfall as a Category 3 in southwest Florida. Irma’s
hurricane-force winds (Figure 15a–b; dotted cells) impacted the western two-thirds of the
model – particularly the southwest coastlines – while leaving the east-coast unscathed.
Evacuation orders were issued along both coasts in FLEE (Figure 15a–b; red cells),
similar what was observed during Irma (Wong et al. 2018; Darzi et al. 2020; model
description in Figure 3 of HRM21). The comparison with empirical data increase our
confidence the evacuation order algorithm – and the synthesized National Hurricane
Center forecasts on which its based – behaves sufficiently realistically for the purpose of
the subsequent experiments.
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Figure 15: Evacuation rates and traffic by grid cell for the default hurricane scenarios. Also shown is
the population by grid cell (g) to provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include Miami-Ft.
Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando
(orange star). In addition, the number of evacuees still enroute at the end of the simulations are shown.

Irma’s simulated evacuation rates (Figure 15a) are similar to observational data, which
suggest evacuation rates vary from 20–40% along Florida’s east coast, to 40–70% across
the south and west coasts, and around 10–30% inland (Wong et al. 2018; Long et al.
2020; Martin et al. 2020; Feng and Lin 2021). This was the largest evacuation in US
history, meaning many households failed to evacuate due to excessive traffic. This occurs
most frequently around Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg in FLEE (Figure 15b), again matching
observations (Feng and Lin 2021; States et al. 2021).
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Table 8 depicts evacuation rates across impact zones. 32.0% of households on the model
grid evacuate for Irma, which equals 5.4 million people. Estimates from the Florida
Department of Emergency Management (2017) suggest actual evacuation numbers
totaled 6.9 million. When considering households evacuating to local shelters in FLEE
(not shown), the simulated evacuation rates are similar to observations. For a given level
of wind impact, evacuation rates are higher along the coasts than inland, which typical for
real-world evacuations (Feng and Lin 2021; Martin et al. 2020).

% Successfully evacuated
Experiment

Total Coastal Inland
(all
>64
>64
cells) knot
knot
zone
zone

Coastal
< 64
knot
zone

Inland
< 64
knot
zone

% Under
evacuation
orders who
evacuated

% Not
Gave
under
up to
evacuation traffic
orders who
evacuated

Irma

32.0

39.3

24.5

29.6

29.4

34.9

25.6

2.5

Dorian

12.0

-

-

14.7

0.6

35.4

4.3

0.7

Irma-RO

26.3

30.2

18.8

26.8

28.9

28.8

25.3

7.7

Table 8: Evacuation rates and traffic by impact zones for the default storm scenarios. Successful
evacuation rates are broken down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing vs. not
experiencing hurricane force winds of 64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate via
evacuation order who did evacuate), shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed to
evacuate who did), and the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to
excessive amounts of traffic.

The evolution of evacuation rates and traffic is shown across time in Figure 16. Despite
not receiving evacuation orders, some households (black solid line) evacuate in the first
0–72 hours. Evacuation rates increase linearly between 72–108 hours as evacuation
orders expand. Just before the storm moves ashore around 126 hours, evacuation rates
decrease, while the number of households giving up due to excessive traffic (black
dashed line) increase. These temporal patterns of evacuations, as with the spatial
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patterns, generally match existing empirical data (e.g., Wong et al. 2018). Therefore, we
believe FLEE’s simulated evacuations provide a realistic baseline for interpreting results
from Irma’s other experiments.

Figure 16: Evacuation rates and traffic over time for the default hurricane scenarios. Evacuation rates
are shown (solid lines), averaged across all grid cells, as are the percentage giving up due to traffic (dashed
line). The times of landfall for the Irma and Irma-RO scenarios are indicated (vertical dashed lines).

3.2 Hurricane Dorian
Dorian’s early forecasts (Figure 13 of HRM21) place the entire Florida peninsula under
threat, with the most likely scenario as a landfalling major hurricane along Florida’s east
coast. Because of the forecasts, evacuation orders were issued along the majority of
FLEE’s east coast (Figure 15c–d; red cells), matching what was observed (TIME 2019).
However, after remaining nearly-stationary over the Bahamas for many hours, the storm
accelerates northward, missing Florida’s east coast entirely.
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Dorian is a fundamentally different storm with less people at risk. As a result, evacuation
rates were less with Dorian (12.0%) than Irma (32.0%), which is 3.3 million less evacuees
(Table 8). Due to fewer evacuees overall – and the evacuation being spread over a longer
time (Figure 16; blue lines) – less people give up due to traffic (0.7%) than Irma (2.5%).
Evacuation rates and traffic are confined to the east coast with Dorian (Figure 15c–d),
matching our understanding of what occurred (Mongold et al. 2020).
Though robust empirical data on Dorian’s evacuation rates is not available, the available
data suggests the model is generating reasonable evacuation behaviors i.e., the Dorian
simulation appears accurate as possible given current empirical data, and is reasonable
for experimentation.
3.3 Hurricane Irma-RO
The hypothetical Irma-RO forecasts are shown in Figure 17. For each grid cell, the peak
magnitudes of forecast risk are identical to Irma’s forecasts. However, the forecasts – and
subsequently, the simulation –

are compressed from 168 hours to 72 hours. By

comparing the evacuation response between the real and hypothetical storms, we aim to
explore the potential effects of a storm that exhibits rapid onset (and also, to a degree,
rapid intensification) on the hurricane evacuation dynamics.
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Figure 17: Forecasts for Hurricane Irma-RO approaching FLEE’s 10 x 4 version of the north-south axis
of Florida. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every 6 hours (not shown). For a detailed
explanation of the forecasts’ conceptualization and implementation, see HRM21.

FLEE’s response to the Irma-RO forecast is similar to Irma’s, but with key differences.
First, evacuation orders (Figure 15e–f, red cells) are not issued around Jacksonville
(Figure 15g, green star). This occurs because the westward shift in forecasts happens
more quickly than with Irma, meaning the area was removed from risk before evacuation
order decisions were made. As a result, Irma-RO has 300,000 fewer people intending to
evacuate in these regions, despite having identical peak magnitudes of risk.
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In addition, a lower percentage of the Florida population evacuates Irma-RO (26.3%) than
Irma (32.0%). This is partially because fewer evacuation orders are issued, but mostly
because more people gave up evacuating due to excessive traffic in Irma-RO (7.7%) than
Irma (2.5%), an increase of 852,000 people (Table 8). The increased traffic is mostly
confined to the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg metropolitan areas and surrounding southwest
coastlines. However, unlike with Irma, residents around Miami-Ft. Lauderdale also
experience significant traffic (Figure 15f). Therefore, we believe the Irma-RO case
suggests that rapid-onset – and possibly, rapid intensification – can worsen evacuation
rates and traffic in higher-risk areas. This is consistent with our conceptual understanding
of these situations, as there is less time to evacuate safely.
3.4 Public Transportation and Carpooling
In the following subsections, we modify key model parameters and compare their
evacuation behaviors to the Irma, Dorian, and Irma-RO default, baseline experiments
discussed earlier. Specifically, we assess how evacuation outcomes change with
evacuation management strategies and policies (public transportation, contraflow,
evacuation order timing) and evolving population characteristics (population growth,
urbanization). The idea is to demonstrate how models like FLEE can explore the role of
these factors in improving evacuations, including exploring 1) how the factors impact
evacuation success, 2) how their impacts vary across forecast scenarios, and 3) how their
impacts are distributed geographically.
Relative to evacuation management strategies like contraflow, public transportation and
carpooling is studied less frequently and is rarely provided (e.g., summary in Murray-Tuite
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et al 2019; Bullard and Wright 2011; exceptions in Swamy et al. 2017; Zhang and Chang
2014). To our knowledge, additional public transportation was not offered for Irma or
Dorian, nor was carpooling widely used across households. The goal of this section is to
demonstrate how models like FLEE can explore the role of these strategies in improving
evacuations.
Experiments were conducted by changing the number of people evacuating per car from
4 (default) to 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8. For a given number of evacuees, this experiment changes
the number of cars on the road. For example, going from 4 to 2 people per car doubles
the number of cars evacuating. On the other hand, going from 4 to 8 people per car halves
the number of cars evacuating. Though the car-length is kept the same in FLEE (in reality,
if simulating buses, it should be longer), this is intended as a first-order exploration of the
effects of strategies such as public transportation and carpooling using FLEE.
Evacuation rates and traffic are shown in Table 9. Across all scenarios, results indicate
that evacuation rates increase when public transportation and carpooling are used as
fewer people get stuck in traffic and give up evacuating. These improvements are
significant. For example, with Irma, going from 4 to 6 people per car improves evacuation
rates by 2.2%, an increase of 500,000 people. The magnitude of improvements is
scenario-dependent, with the largest improvements happening with Irma-RO followed by
Irma and Dorian (this is because Irma-RO has the most traffic issues, followed by Irma
and then Dorian).
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Experiments

Irma

Dorian

Irma-RO

Evacuati
on
Rates

%
Evacuat
Change ed
relative
to
default

%
Under
evacuat
ion
orders
who
evacuat
ed

% Not % Gave
under
up due
evacuati to traffic
on
orders
who
evacuat
ed

Gave
up due
to
traffic

2/car

22.5

-9.5

3.67m

25.5

16.0

12.0

1.97m

3/car

28.5

-3.5

4.67m

32.0

20.9

6.0

980k

4/car
(default)

32.0

0

5.24m

34.9

25.6

2.5

410k

5/car

33.7

+1.7

5.52m

26.4

27.6

0.8

130k

6/car

34.2

+2.2

5.61m

37.1

27.9

0.3

49k

8/car

34.4

+2.4

5.64m

37.1

28.3

0.1

16k

2/car

9.5

-2.5

1.56m

26.7

3.9

3.1

508k

3/car

11.2

-0.8

1.84m

32.9

4.2

1.4

229k

4/car
(default)

12.0

0

1.97m

35.4

4.3

0.7

115k

5/car

12.2

+0.2

1.99m

36.4

4.3

0.4

66k

6/car

12.3

+0.3

2.02m

36.8

4.3

0.3

49k

8/car

12.5

+0.5

2.05m

37.8

3.7

0.1

16k

2/car

16.9

-9.4

2.77m

17.4

16.0

17.1

2.81m

3/car

21.5

-4.8

3.52m

23.1

18.6

12.4

2.03m

4/car
(default)

26.3

0

4.31m

28.8

25.3

7.7

1.26m

5/car

29.7

+3.4

4.87m

32.3

25.0

4.3

704k

6/car

31.0

+4.7

5.08m

34.2

25.6

2.9

475k

8/car

33.2

+6.9

5.44m

37.0

26.4

0.9

147k

Table 9: Evacuation rates and traffic for the public transportation and carpooling experiments. Also
shown are the total numbers evacuated, numbers giving up due to traffic, compliance rates (i.e., those
instructed to evacuate via evacuation order who did evacuate), and shadow evacuation rates (i.e.,
percentage of people not instructed to evacuate who did).
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The experiments also reveal non-linearities in the system (Table 9). For example, in all
forecast scenarios, doubling the number of evacuating cars (i.e., going from 4 to 2 people
per car) results in significantly larger changes to evacuation rates than halving the number
of evacuating cars (i.e., going from 4 to 8 people per car). We believe this suggests
excessive traffic can worsen evacuations exponentially. Future work may consider
furthering our understanding of this relationship, including identifying whether tipping
points exist, or whether targeted carpooling and bussing helps, supporting practitioners
in risk management.
Figure 18 shows which areas are impacted by the public transportation and carpooling
experiments. In the 8 people per car experiment, evacuation rates and traffic improve
areas heavily trafficked in the default simulations (default in Figure 15). In the 2 people
per car experiment, evacuations worsen considerably, particularly across at-risk areas
where evacuees are dependent on traffic downstream i.e., southern Florida.
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Figure 18: Evacuation rates and traffic by grid cell for select carpooling and public transit
experiments. Values are expressed as changes relative to default, as shown in Figure 15. Also expressed
is the population by grid cell (g). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and
Orlando (orange star).

By and large, results suggest that public transportation and carpooling improve
evacuations significantly. This is especially true for the most heavily trafficked scenarios
and regions in these scenarios (i.e., Irma-RO, south Florida). More broadly, results
confirm FLEE behaves appropriately for this type of modification. It also demonstrates
how this type of modeling framework can be used to explore public transportation and
carpooling use across many scenarios, real and synthetic, and to identify regions to target
using the strategy.
3.5 Contraflow
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Though used before Hurricane’s Floyd (1999) and Katrina (2005), contraflow was not
implemented, to our knowledge, on a wide-scale for Irma or Dorian (Wong et al., 2018;
Wolshon and Lambert 2004), as it requires considerable personnel resources and must
be planned days in advance (e.g., summary in Murray-Tuite et al. 2019). Here we aim to
explore how contraflow might have influenced evacuations in these cases, and more
broadly, to examine how strategies focused on improving road capacity compare with
other evacuation management strategies and factors in the forecast-evacuation system.
As described in HRM21, FLEE’s road network consists of two northbound, five-lane
interstates situated on the model’s “coasts” (i.e., Florida’s I-75 and I-95). Meanwhile, two
east-west running, three-lane interstates move evacuees across the grid horizontally (i.e.,
I-75 and I-4), while eight two-lane highways move inland residents onto the “coastal”
interstates where they flee to safety. Here we examine the influence of adding contraflow
on these highways and interstates.
Evacuation rates and traffic are shown when adding one lane on I-95 and I-75, and one,
two, and three lanes across the entire road network (Table 10). Contraflow improves
evacuation rates across all scenarios, confirming the model behaves appropriately.
Adding lanes everywhere is more effective than adding lanes on one highway, consistent
with other studies (e.g., see Murray-Tuite et al 2019). Opening three lanes of contraflow
before Irma increases evacuation rates by 1.9%. For comparison, the public
transportation experiments of 5 and 6 people per car increase evacuation rates by 1.7%
and 2.2%, respectively.
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Experiments

Irma

Dorian

Irma-RO

Evacuati
on
Rates

%
Change
relative
to
default

Evacuat
ed

%
Under
evacuat
ion
orders
who
evacuat
ed

% Not % Gave Gave
under
up due up due
evacuati to traffic to traffic
on
orders
who
evacuat
ed

Default

32.0

0

5.24m

34.9

25.6

2.5

409k

+1 I-95

32.1

+0.1

5.26m

35.0

25.8

2.4

393k

+1 I-75

32.0

0

5.24m

34.9

25.6

2.5

409k

+1 all

32.7

+0.7

5.36m

35.7

26.0

1.9

311k

+2 all

33.5

+1.5

5.49m

36.3

27.2

1.0

163k

+3 all

33.9

+1.9

5.56m

36.8

27.4

0.7

115k

Default

12.0

0

1.97m

35.4

4.3

0.7

115k

+1 I-95

12.2

+0.2

2.0m

36.3

3.8

0.5

82k

+1 I-75

12.0

0

1.97m

35.5

4.3

0.7

115k

+1 all

12.1

+0.1

1.98m

36.2

4.3

0.5

82k

+2 all

12.3

+0.3

2.02m

36.7

4.3

0.3

49k

+3 all

12.3

+0.3

2.02m

36.9

4.3

0.3

49k

Default

26.3

0

4.31m

28.8

25.3

7.7

1.26m

+1 I-95

27.1

+0.8

4.44m

29.2

23.2

6.9

1.13m

+1 I-75

26.3

0

4.31m

28.8

22.1

7.6

1.25m

+1 all

28.0

+1.7

4.59m

30.6

23.5

5.9

967k

+2 all

29.3

+3.0

4.80m

31.8

25.0

4.7

770k

+3 all

29.8

+3.5

4.88m

32.6

25.0

4.2

688k

Table 10: Evacuation rates and traffic for the contraflow experiments. Also shown are the total
numbers evacuated, numbers giving up due to traffic, compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate
via evacuation order who did evacuate), and shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not
instructed to evacuate who did).

71

The magnitude of improvements from contraflow are forecast-scenario-dependent (Table
10). For example, relative to the default simulations, adding three lanes increases
evacuation rates by 1.9% with Irma, 0.3% with Dorian, and 3.5% with Irma-RO. In terms
of areas impacted (Figure 19), contraflow improves heavily trafficked areas in the default
scenarios (i.e., urban areas and areas dependent on traffic “upstream” like south Florida).
This is consistent with the public transportation and carpooling experiments, suggesting
evacuation management strategies are most effective in heavily-trafficked forecast
scenarios and regions.

Figure 19: Evacuation rates and traffic by grid cell for select contraflow experiments. Values are
expressed as changes relative to default, as shown in Figure 1. Also expressed is the population by grid
cell (g). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow
star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando (orange star).
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Overall, results suggest that adding road capacity through strategies such as
implementing contraflow can improve evacuations significantly. Results also show how
FLEE can compare the relative importance of factors to evacuation success and identify
areas benefiting most from contraflow across scenarios, thus potentially supporting
decision-makers in their cost-benefit analyses.
3.6 Evacuation Order Timing
Regarding evacuation orders, there are modeling studies investigating how to optimize
evacuation order timing to support decision-makers (e.g., see summary in Yi et al. 2016;
examples in Dixit and Radwan 2009, Davidson et al. 2019; clearance time studies in
Florida Statewide Regional Evacuation Study Program 2019). Building upon this work,
we explore the importance of evacuation order timing in FLEE, specifically by issuing
orders 10 and 20 hours earlier and later than the default simulations (note: this was done
by adjusting the clearance times for each grid cell, which subsequently shifts evacuation
order decision-making thresholds by these amounts; description in HRM21).
When averaged across all grid cells, shifting the timing of evacuation orders did not
meaningfully impact evacuation rates and traffic. The largest changes occurred with IrmaRO; however, evacuation rates only improved by 0.8%, 0.8%, 0.2%, and 0.1% for the 20
hours earlier, 10 hours earlier, 10 hours later, and 20 hours later experiments,
respectively (not shown). The effects are much smaller than implementing public
transportation or contraflow.
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Figure 20: Evacuation rates and traffic by grid cell for select evacuation order timing experiments.
Values are expressed as changes relative to default, as shown in Figure 1. Also expressed is the population
by grid cell (g). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale
(yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando (orange star).

However, between grid cells, evacuation order timing has complex – but sometimes
significant – impacts (Figure 20). For example, during Irma, later evacuation orders
improve evacuation rates around Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg by 3-6%, and reduce
evacuation rates along the northwest coastline and Jacksonville metroplex by 5-11%. The
latter is actually a positive, however, as the later evacuation order thresholds caused
evacuation orders to not be issued in this area, as the forecast risk shifted westward,
removing Jacksonville from harm’s way. In this way, FLEE captures the tradeoff between
issuing evacuation orders earlier (earlier warnings) versus waiting (reduction in false
alarms). Similar impacts occur with Dorian, where later evacuation orders reduced
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evacuation rates, and subsequently, false alarms. With Irma-RO, earlier orders helps
generally (but also increases false alarms), while later evacuation orders again exhibits
localized effects (e.g., it improves evacuation rates inland but worsens evacuations along
coastal grid cells).
Relative to public transportation, carpooling, and contraflow, evacuation order timing has
little impact on evacuation rates/traffic overall. That’s not to say it’s unimportant, however,
as evacuation order timing has significant but localized effects on evacuations that varies
considerably across scenarios. Perhaps this is to be expected, as evacuation orders are
earlier in FLEE’s “order of operations” between sub-systems. Future work may consider
studying these complex effects by shifting evacuation order timing at specific areas in
FLEE, studying more forecast scenarios, and/or by implementing phased evacuations
(e.g., building on Chiu et al. 2008; Chen and Zhan 2008; Zhang and Chang 2014).
3.7 Population Growth and Urbanization
To our knowledge, few studies explore how US hurricane evacuations may change with
population growth and urbanization. In this section, we begin to explore these effects by
increasing FLEE’s Florida peninsula population from 16.9 million in 2020 to 2030 and
2040 projections of 19.3 million and 22.3 million, respectively (see Figure 21g–h for
population increase by grid cell; projections in Florida Department of Transportation
2020). Meanwhile, a third experiment representing the potential effects of urbanization is
conducted by making the population density uniform across the model grid. Together,
these experiments begin to look at how evacuations may change with population

75

characteristics, including how it impacts evacuation success relative to evacuation
management strategies.

Figure 21: Evacuation rates and traffic by grid cell for the 2030 and 2040 projected populations.
Values are expressed as changes relative to default, as shown in Figure 1. Also expressed is the 2030
population by grid cell (g) and the 2040 population by grid cell (h). These provide a frame of reference e.g.,
major cities depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star),
Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando (orange star).

Evacuation statistics are shown for this set of experiments in Table 11. Results suggest
that evacuations may worsen in the future due to projected population changes. For
example, relative to the default simulation, Irma’s evacuation rates decrease by 1.3% and
3.3% in 2030 and 2040, respectively. Relative to the evacuation management strategies
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tested earlier, the changes are significant, e.g., adding three lanes of contraflow increases
evacuation by 1.9%, and going from 4 to 3 people/car decreases evacuation rates by
3.5%. Lastly, making population density uniform improves evacuations overall. To a first
order, this provides evidence that urbanization can worsen evacuations rates.

Experiments

Irma

Dorian

Irma-RO

Evacu
ation
Rates

%
Change
relative
to
default

Evacuat
ed

%
Under
evacuat
ion
orders
who
evacuat
ed

% Not % Gave Gave up
under
up due due to
evacuati to traffic traffic
on
orders
but
evacuat
ed

Default

32.0

0

5.24m

34.9

25.6

2.5

409k

Uniform

33.6

+1.6

5.51m

36.7

29.8

2.6

426k

2030

30.7

-1.3

5.93m

33.3

24.9

3.6

695k

2040

28.7

-3.3

6.38m

31.8

22.1

5.5

1.22m

Default

12.0

0

1.97m

35.4

4.3

0.7

115k

Uniform

11.2

-0.8

1.84m

36.4

3.8

0.6

98k

2030

11.6

-0.4

2.24m

34.1

4.4

1.0

193k

2040

11.2

-0.8

2.49m

32.7

4.5

1.5

333k

Default

26.3

0

4.31m

28.8

25.3

7.7

1.26m

Uniform

29.2

+2.9

4.79m

32.0

26.7

6.0

983m

2030

23.7

-2.6

4.58m

28.1

20.0

10.0

1.93m

2040

21.9

-4.4

4.87m

23.6

21.7

11.7

2.61m

Table 11: Evacuation rates and traffic for the population growth and urbanization
experiments. Also shown are the total numbers evacuated, numbers giving up due to traffic, compliance
rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate via evacuation order who did evacuate), and shadow evacuation
rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed to evacuate who did).
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As with public transportation, carpooling, and contraflow, the impacts of population growth
and urbanization are scenario dependent. For example, the 2040 experiments result in a
3.3% decrease in evacuation rates with Irma, a 0.8% decrease with Dorian, and a 4.4%
decrease with Irma-RO, i.e., the heavily-trafficked scenarios are most sensitive to
changes in the evacuation dynamics.
Figure 21 shows the change in evacuation rates and traffic by grid cell for these population
change experiments. In the Irma and Irma-RO scenarios, evacuation worsen in
2030/2040 across the southern half of the model, with notable impacts surrounding
Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg and Miami-Ft. Lauderdale. This also occurs in Dorian, though
to a lesser extent, mainly in the areas at risk (Figure 21c–d; red cells) that are most
“upstream” i.e., southern portions of the areas at risk.
Results suggest that, in the absence of other changes, population growth and
urbanization may worsen future evacuations. Its impacts may be most significant in
heavily-trafficked, rapid-onset forecast scenarios, and across south Florida, which is
further “upstream” with respect to traffic flow. More broadly, the value of the experiments
is they show how agent-based frameworks like FLEE can explore evacuations across
many different forecast-population scenarios, both real and hypothetical, and in doing so,
emphasize the need for additional implementation of evacuation management strategies
moving forward.
4. Summary and Conclusions
This paper explores the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system dynamics using an agentbased framework positioned to study interactions across the forecast-human-built
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environment sub-systems. By changing key model parameters one-by-one, we
investigate how evacuations change with public transportation, contraflow, evacuation
order timing, population growth, urbanization, and different forecast scenarios affecting
the Florida peninsula (e.g., Irma, Dorian, rapid-onset version of Irma). In viewing the
results, we ask the following questions:
1) How do the changes impact evacuation success? Results suggest that
forecasts, public transportation and carpooling, contraflow, and population growth
significantly impact evacuation rates and traffic. Evacuation order timing is less
important overall, but has significant, localized effects.

2) How does this vary across forecast-population scenarios? We find evidence
that evacuations are less successful with population growth and rapid onset
scenarios. We also find that evacuation management strategies are most effective
in these heavily-trafficked scenarios.

3) How are impacts distributed geographically? Heavily-trafficked areas (e.g.,
urban areas at-risk and/or places “upstream” of traffic) benefit from evacuation
management strategies the most. Population growth and urbanization particularly
negatively impact southern Florida.
Additionally, we find evidence that non-linearities exist in the traffic portion of FLEE, where
excessive traffic can worsen evacuations significantly. These results demonstrate how
agent-based frameworks like FLEE are powerful virtual laboratories capable of
investigating the system dynamics across many forecast-population-infrastructure
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scenarios, real or synthetic, including non-linear effects. The findings presented are not
intended to be definitive, but rather to improve understanding of the system dynamics and
to provide a foundation for this type of work.
FLEE and/or models with additional detail provide several, immediate opportunities for
future work. One avenue is to further investigate the system’s non-linearities, including
identifying saturation points to be avoided. Another is to unpack the role of evacuation
order timing in evacuation success. A third area of immediate future work is to assess
how changes in forecast track, intensity, storm size, forward speed, and uncertainty
influence evacuation success in FLEE (see, e.g., Fossell et al. 2017). This would
demonstrate to meteorologists how agent-based models offer a societally-relevant
alternative to traditional measures of forecast accuracy (a need described by Morss 2005,
Murphy 1993, Roebber and Bosart 1996), by measuring the impact of forecasts on
different aspects of evacuation.
Looking further ahead, as empirical data on evacuation behaviors and traffic improves,
the information can be codified into virtual laboratories like FLEE, thus increasing their
realism, and subsequently, their ability to answer questions of interest. In this way,
empirical and modeling studies feedback into each other and provide many future
opportunities to advance our understanding of the hurricane forecast-evacuation system.
The research supports practitioners, policy-makers, and scholars in hazard risk
management and related disciplines, thereby offering the promise of direct applications
to save lives and mitigate hurricane losses. For example, practitioners can use these
types of models to explore different scenarios and build understanding about which
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evacuation strategies may be most effective, when, and where. Policymakers can use the
information to identify resource needs in future forecast-population scenarios. And
researchers particularly benefit from studying the system holistically, where crossdisciplinary understanding can be cultivated (Bostrom et al. 2016).
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ARTICLE 3:
A NEW VERIFICATION APPROACH? USING COUPLED NATURAL-HUMAN
MODELS TO EVALUATE FORECAST IMPACT ON EVACUATIONS

1. Introduction
Murphy (1993), Roebber and Bosart (1996), and Morss (2005) show how “accurate”
forecasts are not necessarily useful ones. Hurricanes Irma (2017) and Rita (2005)
exemplify this distinction. Irma’s 3-10-day forecasts called for landfall as a major hurricane
in southeast Florida near Miami–Ft. Lauderdale; this triggered the largest evacuation in
US history (FDEM 2017), with Tampa Bay–St. Petersburg in west Florida as a common
evacuation destination. However, as the storm approached, forecasts shifted westward,
and the storm eventually made a landfall near Tampa Bay–St. Petersburg, while avoiding
major impacts in Miami–Ft. Lauderdale altogether (Cangialosi et al. 2018; Wong et al.
2018). Meanwhile, uncertainties in Rita’s track and intensity forecasts, combined with the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, led to severe traffic in Houston–Galveston. The worst of
the storm missed the city, but had it struck Houston–Galveston directly, the
consequences could have been severe, as many evacuees were stranded on highways
(Zhang et al. 2007; Knabb et al. 2006).
Irma and Rita’s forecasts were accurate by meteorological standards, with Irma’s
westward shift falling within the National Hurricane Center’s (NHC) cone of uncertainty
(Cangialosi et al. 2018), and with Rita’s track errors being less than average errors at the
time (Knabb et al. 2006). However, the above discussion illustrates several ways in which
the forecasts were less successful in providing useful guidance for evacuation decisions.
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Thus, in addition to measuring skill in terms of errors in a hurricane’s track and other
meteorological characteristics, the National Academy of Sciences recommends the
weather enterprise “measure the impact of forecasts” (p. 105; NASEM 2018) i.e., to
increase forecast usefulness, traditional accuracy metrics should be supplemented with
a new approach.
Coupled natural-human models are increasingly being used to model aspects of
hurricane evacuations (e.g., Davidson et al. 2018; Blanton et al. 2018), including warning
communication (e.g., Morss et al. 2017; Watts et al. 2018), evacuation-related decisionmaking (e.g. Yin et al. 2014; Widener et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2009; Davidson et al. 2018),
and evacuation traffic (e.g., Yang et al. 2019; Yi et al. 2017). These models provide a tool
where empirical knowledge can be codified and used to run virtual experiments for many
evacuation scenarios, real or synthetic. This suggests that coupled natural-human models
could be used to study the impacts of forecast elements and uncertainties on evacuations.
With this in mind, Harris et al. (2021) (hereafter HRM21) designed a coupled-model
framework, called FLEE (Forecasting Laboratory for Exploring the Evacuation-system),
that models the key, interwoven aspects of hurricane evacuations: the natural hazard
(hurricane), the human system (information flow, evacuation decisions), the built
environment (road infrastructure), and connections between systems (forecasts and
warning information, traffic, impact zones). Hurricane and forecast information are
represented using archived National Hurricane Center (NHC) forecast products. Two
agent-based models replicate the information flows, evacuee decision-making, built
infrastructure, and evacuation traffic. By integrating the systems into a unified framework,
FLEE becomes a “virtual laboratory” positioned to advance fundamental knowledge of
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the system’s dynamics and explore the role of hurricane forecasts in the forecastevacuation system (e.g., see FLEE’s conceptualization, implementation, validation, and
proof of concept experiments in HRM21; use in studying evacuation management
strategies and policies, evolving population characteristics, and forecast scenarios in
Article 2 of the dissertation).
Using FLEE, this paper’s objective is to explore how tropical cyclone forecast elements
impact evacuations, and in doing so, to build towards the development of new verification
approaches. Within the coupled-model framework, we perturb forecasts of track amounts
typical of errors today (2021) – and in the past (2001) – and evaluate their impact on
evacuations across both real and hypothetical forecast scenarios (e.g., Hurricane Irma,
and Hurricane Dorian making landfall across east Florida). For these storms, we compare
forecast track errors with intensity and forward speed errors characteristic of rapidly
intensifying/onset scenarios, which are widely studied in meteorology.
Throughout the analysis, we ask:
1) What is the relative influence of changes in forecast elements (e.g., track vs.
intensity)?
2) Do improvements in forecast accuracy over time (e.g., 2001–2021) translate to
improved evacuations?
In answering these questions, we demonstrate how coupled natural-human models, and
specifically agent-based models, offer a societally-relevant alternative to traditional
metrics of forecast accuracy, by exploring the impact of forecasts elements and
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uncertainties on how people receive and process the information, make evacuation
decisions, and physically evacuate.
2. Design and Approach
To answer questions 1–2, we first determine what “typical” errors are for different
elements of tropical cyclone forecasts, both today and in the past. For track and intensity,
average forecast errors – and their trends over time – are documented and available at
0–120

hour

lead

times

on

the

NHC

website

(https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/index.shtml). Forward speed forecast errors are
not readily available to the public, though they are noted to be “slightly larger than crosstrack errors” (Fossell et al. 2017). Storm size forecast errors are also unavailable, as it is
impossible to verify wind radii forecasts because they “are likely to have errors so large
as to render a verification of official radii forecasts unreliable” (Cangialosi 2021). Based
on data availability, we focus on NHC track and intensity forecasts errors.
To explore the role of forecast track on evacuations, our approach is to introduce
perturbed tracks to the left and right of NHC’s official track forecasts by distances equaling
2001 and 2021 average errors at 0–120 hour lead times (Table C1). Then, the left and
right perturbed forecasts are ingested into FLEE and used to run evacuation simulations.
By comparing the evacuation response from perturbed forecasts to those from the official
forecasts, we assess the relative importance of track errors on evacuations.
There are several details to note. First, we compare average errors in 2021 with 2001, as
this represents 20 years of improvements in track accuracy (also, 96–120 hour lead time
errors were not readily available before 2001). Second, since forecast information
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updates every 6 hours in FLEE (and in the real-world), the left/right perturbed tracks
update

every

6

hours.

Third,

the

official

forecasts

were

downloaded

at

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/gis/ for Irma and Dorian; ArcGIS was used for data
visualization and track perturbations.
To explore the role of forecast intensity on evacuations, we intended to introduce
perturbed intensities higher/lower than original forecasts by amounts representing
average errors in 2001 and 2021. However, average errors are less than 20 kts, even at
long lead times. As a result, intensity errors are too small to effectively resolve in FLEE,
where forecasts are synthesized into a green-yellow-orange-red “light system” forecast
for all grid cells (see HRM21). Because of the limitation, we instead create rapid
intensity/onset (RI/RO) forecast scenarios where intensity and forward speed errors are
significant. In these scenarios, we shorten the forecast timeline of the original NHC
forecasts (e.g., from 168 hours to 84 and 72 hours), while keeping the peak magnitudes
of risk the same, and determine its effect on evacuations. By comparing the evacuation
response from RI/RO forecast scenarios to those from the official forecasts, we begin to
assess the relative importance of RI/RO on evacuations (note: in these RI/RO scenarios,
track, intensity, and forward speed elements are intertwined; see Figures C5–6, C12–13).
To compare evacuation behaviors quantitatively, we track evacuation statistics for FLEE’s
grid cells (note: FLEE’s grid is a 10 x 4 abstracted representation of the north-south axis
of Florida; full description of FLEE’s virtual world and built environment in HRM21). The
primary model outputs analyzed here are the percent of households that successfully
evacuated (i.e., evacuation rates), and the percent who intended to evacuate but gave up
due to traffic. The latter statistic provides insight to where the excessive traffic may be
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preventing successful evacuations. In addition to displaying these output data by grid
cells, we aggregate data into multiple impact zones, designed as first-order
approximations of areas likely to experience different levels of impacts based on the
actual meteorological conditions produced by the storms. In interpreting results, we
compare metrics that might indicate successful outcomes in different ways e.g., high
evacuation rates may not be “good” if the storm ends up not having much impact in those
areas, and unnecessary evacuations may not matter if those at highest risk can get out
safely.
The list of experiments is provided in Table 12. Along with a default simulation,
simulations are run for the four perturbed track forecasts and two RI/RO forecasts across
two storm scenarios: one real (Irma) and one hypothetical (Hurricane Dorian making
landfall across east Florida). In the hypothetical case, Dorian and its forecasts were
shifted west of the original track by 70 km so the storm impacts eastern Florida (Section
3.2). Together, these experiments allow us, to first-order, to 1) compare the relative
influence of track forecast errors to RI/RO cases and 2) assess whether improvements in
forecast accuracy over time translate to improved evacuations across different cases, real
and synthetic.
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Irma

Dorian (landfalling)

1. Default

8.

Default

2. 2001 Left

9.

2001 Left

3. 2001 Right

10. 2001 Right

4. 2021 Left

11. 2021 Left

5. 2021 Right

12. 2021 Right

6. RI/RO

13. RI/RO

7. RI/RO – 12 hours

14. RI/RO – 12 hours

Table 12: Experiments in the study. The Default Irma and Dorian (landfalling) case uses official NHC
forecasts for Irma and Dorian. However, Dorian’s later forecasts are intentionally shifted westward to create
a hypothetical scenario where the storm impacts eastern Florida. RI/RO cases contain default forecasts
shortened from 168 hours to 84 hours, while the RI/RO-12 hours case contains forecasts shortened further
to 72 hours. Track errors are introduced by shifting the forecast left/right from default by amounts equivalent
to average errors in 2001 and 2021.

3. Results
3.1.

Hurricane Irma

Irma’s official (Table 12– default) forecasts are shown in Figure 22 at 24 hour intervals.
Early forecasts place the entire model grid under threat, with the most likely outcome as
a landfalling major hurricane near Miami. However, forecasts shifted westward as the
storm approached, with the storm eventually making one mainland U.S. landfall as a
Category 4 in the Florida Keys and a second landfall as a Category 3 in southwest Florida.
Irma’s hurricane-force winds (Figure 23a–b; dotted cells) impacted the western two-thirds
of the model – particularly the southwest coastlines – while leaving the east-coast
unscathed. Evacuation orders were issued along both coasts in FLEE (Figure 23a–b; red
cells), matching what was observed, thus increasing our confidence that the evacuation
order algorithm – and the synthesized NHC forecasts on which it is based – behave
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realistically in the model context (Wong et al. 2018; Darzi et al. 2020; additional
verification provided in HRM21).
Also shown on Figure 22 are perturbed left and right tracks based on average errors in
2001 (blue arrows) and 2021 (green arrows). Compared to default, the left perturbed
tracks place more of south/western Florida under threat, while the right perturbed
forecasts place more of north/eastern Florida under threat. Because average forecast
errors decrease closer to landfall, the perturbed track forecasts eventually converge to
the default forecast by 144 hours into the simulation. Note: full light system forecasts for
perturbed tracks are provided in Figures C1–4; light system forecast for RI/RO cases are
provided in Figures C5–6.
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Figure 22: Default forecasts for Hurricane Irma (2017) as the storm approaches and travels through the
Florida-like, model grid. Forecasts are shown at 24 hour intervals, but update every 6 hours in the model
simulations (not shown). Left column: Evolving, official NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts are shown, including the
2001 left/right errors (blue arrows) and the 2021 left/right errors (green arrows). Right three columns: The
light-system threats for wind, surge, and rain are shown for equivalent times in the simulation, with the
forecast track (center black line) and cone of uncertainty (outer black lines) included for reference. Note:
threats are highest when near the center of the forecast cone and when hazards are most imminent, among
other factors.
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Figure 23: Irma’s evacuation rates across grid cells. Evacuation rates are provided for the (a) default
forecast and the (b) percent of households giving up due to excessive traffic. Evacuation rates are also
presented for (c) 2001 left track, (d) 2021 left track, (e) 2001 right track, (f) 2021 right track, (g) RI/RO, and
(h) RI/RO – 12 hour perturbed cases. Values (c–h) are expressed as the departure from the (a) default
forecast evacuation rates. Also expressed is the swath of hurricane force winds (dotted cells), evacuation
orders (red cells), and the population by grid cell (i). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities
depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville
(green star), and Orlando (orange star).

Using the default forecasts, Irma’s simulated evacuation rates (Figure 23a) are similar to
observational data, which suggest evacuation rates varied from 20–40% along Florida’s
east coast, to 40–70% across the south and west coasts, and around 10–30% inland
(Wong et al. 2018; Long et al. 2020; Martin et al. 2020; Feng and Lin 2021). This was the
largest evacuation in US history, meaning many households failed to evacuate due to
excessive traffic. This occurs most frequently around Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (Figure
23b), again similar to observations (Feng and Lin 2021; States et al. 2021).
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Table 13 shows evacuation rates across impact zones. 32.0% of households on the
model grid evacuate for Irma, which equals 5.24 million people. Estimates from the
Florida Department of Emergency Management (2017) suggest actual evacuation
numbers totaled 6.9 million. When considering households evacuating to local shelters in
FLEE (not shown), the simulated evacuation rates match observations. For a given level
of wind impact, evacuation rates are higher along the coasts than inland, which is to be
expected (Feng and Lin 2021; Martin et al. 2020). Therefore, we believe FLEE’s simulated
evacuations provide a realistic baseline for interpreting results from Irma’s other
experiments.
Experiments (a)
Evac
uatio
n
rates

(b) %
Chan
ge
relati
ve to
defau
lt

(c)
People
evacu
ated

(d)
Coastal
>64
knot
zone

(e)
Inland
>64
knot
zone

(f)
Coastal
< 64
knot
zone

(g)
Inland
< 64
knot
zone

(h) %
Gave
up to
traffic

(i)
Gave
up to
traffic

Irma Default

32.0

0

5.24 m

39.3

24.5

29.6

29.4

2.5

410 K

2001 Left

30.2

-1.8

5.10 m

37.7

22.2

27.8

27.4

3.2

541 K

2021 Left

31.9

-0.1

5.39 m

39.4

24.7

29.0

29.4

2.4

406 K

2021 Right

30.9

-1.1

5.22 m

33.2

25.1

32.8

29.5

4.7

794 K

2001 Right

31.4

-0.6

5.31 m

31.6

26.7

35.1

30.0

5.5

929 K

RI/RO

27.3

-4.7

4.61 m

32.0

20.3

27.2

28.4

6.3

1.06 m

RI/RO -12

26.3

-5.7

4.44 m

27.7

18.2

26.5

25.9

7.6

1.28 m

Table 13: Irma’s evacuation behaviors averaged across all grid cells for the different experiments.
Successful evacuation rates are broken down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing
vs. not experiencing hurricane force winds of 64+ kts) and the percentage of evacuees who attempted to
evacuate but “gave up” due to excessive amounts of traffic.
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How do the experiments with Irma’s perturbed tracks translate to evacuations? The 2001
left errors increase evacuation rates across southern and western Florida and reduce
evacuation rates further east (Figure 23c). This results in fewer evacuees overall (Table
13a–c), including fewer evacuees across both >64 knot and <64 knot zones (Table 13d–
g). The 2021 left errors had considerably smaller changes. Relative to default, slightly
fewer people evacuated unnecessarily across northeast Florida (Figure 23d). The 2001
right errors (Figure 23e) resulted in many unnecessary evacuations along the east coast,
and a reduction in evacuation rates across southern and western Florida. The 2001 right
errors had the worst outcomes of the track experiments, with a 7.7% reduction in
evacuation rates across the most impacted coastal >64 knot zone (Table 13d). The 2021
right errors show a similar pattern, but the outcomes are not quite as bad, with a 6.1%
reduction in evacuation rates across the most impacted zones (Table 13d; Figure 23f).
When considering the results together, 2021 errors had better outcomes than 2001 –
suggesting the value of smaller forecast errors – while left errors had better outcomes
than right. The latter is not a general result – left errors are not necessarily better than
right generally, but are a function of areas affected by any particular error i.e., the impact
of errors is very much case/event dependent.
How does this compare with Irma’s RI/RO cases? In both cases, RO/RI leads to a larger
reduction in evacuation rates (Table 13a–b) and a greater increase in evacuation traffic
than with the track errors (Table 13h–i). This includes a significant reduction in evacuation
rates across more-impacted and less-impacted areas (Table 13d–g). The latter is partially
because evacuation orders (Figure 23g–h, red cells) are not issued around Jacksonville
in these cases (Figure 23i, green star), as the forecast’s westward shift happens quicker
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than in default, removing the area from risk before evacuation orders were issued. When
comparing the two RI/RO cases, the case that was 12 hours shorter resulted in worse
evacuation outcomes than RI/RO, particularly when considering the decreases across
the >64 knot zone, suggesting the extra time for evacuation makes a difference (Table
13b–i; Figure 23g–h). Compared to track errors, the two RI/RO cases more negatively
affect evacuation outcomes than the perturbed track cases, suggesting RI/RO is a critical
feature for evacuation success.
3.2.

Hurricane Dorian (landfalling)

Dorian’s (landfalling) forecasts are shown in Figure 24. Early forecasts place the entire
Florida peninsula under threat, with the most likely scenario as a landfalling major
hurricane along Florida’s east coast. Because of the forecasts, evacuation orders were
issued along the majority of the east coast (Figure 25a–b; red cells). The exception is in
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, which avoided evacuation orders, matching what was observed
(TIME 2019). In the actual Dorian case, the storm remains nearly-stationary over the
Bahamas for many hours, before accelerating northward and missing Florida’s east coast.
However, in this hypothetical case, we shift the forecasts westward by one grid cell (70
km) 120–168 hours into the simulation. This creates a scenario where Dorian’s hurricaneforce winds impact Florida’s east coast as the storm accelerates northward (e.g., see
Figure 25a–b; dotted cells).
Also shown on Figure 24 are perturbed left and right tracks based on average errors in
2001 (blue arrows) and 2021 (green arrows). Compared to forecasts in the default case,
left tracks place southern and western Florida under threat, while right tracks place more
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of northern and eastern Florida under threat. Because average forecast errors decrease
as the storm approaches landfall, the perturbed track forecasts eventually converge to
default by 144 hours into the simulation. Note: light system forecasts for perturbed tracks
is provided in Figures C8–11; light system forecast for RI/RO cases are provided in
Figures C12–13.
Evacuation rates were lower with Dorian (landfalling) (16.8%) than Irma (32.0%), which
is 2.4 million less evacuees (Table 14a–c). Due to fewer evacuees overall – and the
evacuation being spread over a longer time (Figures C7, C14) – fewer people give up
due to traffic (0.0%) in Dorian than Irma (2.5%). These outcomes seem reasonable, given
that both the forecasts and the storm itself influence a smaller portion of the model domain
in Dorian (landfalling) compared to Irma.
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Figure 24: Default forecasts for Hurricane Dorian (2019) (landfalling) as the storm approaches and
travels through the Florida-like, model grid. Forecasts are shown at 24 hour intervals, but update every 6
hours in the model simulations (not shown). Left column: Evolving, official NHC forecast track for the original
Dorian (black center line), category (numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and
current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink), and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the
perturbed forecasts are shown, including the 2001 left/right errors (blue arrows) and the 2021 left/right
errors (green arrows). Right three columns: The light-system threats for wind, surge, and rain are shown
for equivalent times in the simulation, with the forecast track (center black line) and cone of uncertainty
(outer black lines) included for reference. Note: threats are highest when near the center of the forecast
cone and when hazards are most imminent, among other factors. Note: the 120-168 h hour forecasts have
been shifted westward by 70 km to create a hypothetical scenario where Dorian makes landfall along the
east coast.
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Figure 25: Dorian LF’s evacuation rates across grid cells. Evacuation rates are provided for the (a)
default setting and (b) the percent of households giving up due to excessive traffic. Evacuation rates are
also presented for (c) 2001 left track, (d) 2021 left track, (e) 2001 right track, (f) 2021 right track, (g) RI/RO,
and (h) RI/RO – 12 hour cases. Values (c–h) are expressed as the departure from the (a) default forecast
evacuation rates. Also expressed is the swath of hurricane force winds (dotted cells), evacuation orders
(red cells), and the population by grid cell (i). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted
include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star),
and Orlando (orange star).
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Experiments (a)
Evac
uatio
n
rates
Dorian LF
16.8
default

(b) %
Change
relative
to
default

(c)
People
evacuat
ed

(d)
Coast
al >64
knot
zone

(e)
Inland
>64
knot
zone

(f)
Coast
al < 64
knot
zone

(g)
Inland
< 64
knot
zone

(h) %
Gave
up to
traffic

(i)
Gave
up to
traffic

0

2.84 m

39.1

-

7.0

18.2

0.0

32

2001 Left

20.6

+ 3.8

3.48 m

39.4

-

13.5

19.8

0.1

10 K

2021 Left

17.4

+ 0.6

2.94 m

39.1

-

8.3

17.8

0.0

460

2021 Right

15.5

- 1.3

2.61 m

39.0

-

5.2

16.9

0.2

35 K

2001 Right

12.2

- 4.6

2.06 m

37.3

-

1.3

13.4

1.1

187 K

RI/RO

18.3

+ 1.5

3.09 m

39.0

-

9.2

19.3

0.1

17 K

RI/RO -12

19.3

+ 2.5

3.26 m

33.9

-

14.7

17.3

3.0

486 K

Table 14: Dorian LF’s evacuation behaviors averaged across all grid cells for the different
experiments. Evacuation rates, percent change in evacuation rates relative to the default simulation, and
the total number of people evacuated are shown. Successful evacuation rates are broken down into impact
zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing vs. not experiencing hurricane force winds of 64+ kts)
and the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to excessive amounts of
traffic.

How do perturbed tracks translate to evacuations in this scenario? 2001 left errors trigger
more evacuations than default (Table 14b), with significant increases around Miami–Ft.
Lauderdale where additional evacuation orders were issued (Figure 25c; red cells). With
the 2021 left errors, evacuation orders were not issued in these regions (Figure 25d),
leading to evacuation rates that more closely resembled the default forecast scenario.
The simulation with 2001 right errors resulted in lower evacuation rates (Table 14a–b),
with fewer evacuees across southeast Florida, and slightly more evacuees up north
(Figure 25e). Of the perturbed tracks, 2021 right errors arguably had the best evacuation
outcomes overall, with a reduction in unnecessary evacuations across southern Florida
(Figure 25f). When considering the results together, it appears the directionally of errors
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matters to evacuations, particularly in how population centers are affected. Furthermore,
experiments suggest that 2001 errors were large enough to shift the issuance of
evacuation orders around Miami–Ft. Lauderdale – which had significant impacts on
evacuation rates and traffic – whereas 2021 errors did not have such a substantial impact.
The RI/RO cases create significant increases in evacuation rates (Table 14a–b) and
evacuation traffic (Table 14h–i) compared to the default simulation. The former is
surprising, as there is less time to evacuate everyone safely, and is opposite to Irma’s
results. Upon closer examination, the increase in evacuation rates occurs primarily across
western Florida (Figure 25g-h) where the shorter timeline forced evacuation decisions
early when forecasts were uncertain. As with the Irma case, the 12 hour difference
between the RI/RO scenarios is significant. For example, in addition to creating
unnecessary evacuations across western Florida, the RI/RO – 12 scenario decreases
evacuation rates along the east coast (Figure 25h), reducing evacuation rates across the
most impacted zones (Table 14d). In summary, compared to track errors, the RI/RO
cases more negatively impacted evacuation outcomes than perturbed tracks, suggesting
RI/RO is a critical feature, and that NHC’s efforts to improve RI/RO forecasting are
important (e.g., DeMaria et al. 2021).
4. Summary and looking ahead
This paper demonstrates how coupled natural-human models can be employed to explore
how changes in hurricane forecasts affect evacuations. Specifically, within one such
framework (FLEE), we create RI/RO cases and track scenarios representative of
accuracy errors today (2021) – and in the past (2001) – and evaluate their impact on
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evacuations across real and hypothetical forecast scenarios (e.g., Hurricane Irma,
Hurricane Dorian making landfall across east Florida).
Our analysis of the results provides first-order assessment of the following questions:
1) What is the relative influence of changes in forecast elements (e.g., track vs.
RI/RO)? Our results confirm that RI/RO scenarios – which are already believed to
be a problem in meteorology (e,g., see DeMaria et al. 2021) – are a significant
feature with respect to evacuation success, as outcomes from the RI/RO
simulations are generally worse than those from perturbed track experiments.
RI/RO scenarios emphasize how track, intensity, and forward speed elements are
intertwined.
2) Do improvements in forecast accuracy over time (2001–2021) translate to
improved evacuation outcomes? We provide evidence suggesting average
track errors in 2001 more negatively impact evacuations than average track errors
in 2021. For example, 2001 errors in the hypothetical Dorian scenario changed the
issuance of evacuation orders in some areas, triggering many unnecessary
evacuations, whereas the 2021 errors did not. Furthermore, an additional 12 hours
of forecast lead time between the RI/RO cases and the RI/RO – 12 cases can
significantly improve evacuations in these scenarios as well.
Additionally, we provide evidence suggesting that hurricane evacuation outcomes are
sensitive to the forecast-population-infrastructure scenarios, e.g., evacuation outcomes
appear especially sensitive when metropolitan areas – which require extra time for
evacuations and evacuation orders – are on the edges of the cone of uncertainty. Results
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from this study are not intended to be definitive; rather they demonstrate, to a first-order,
how coupled natural-human models, and specifically agent-based models, offer a
societally-relevant alternative to traditional metrics of forecast accuracy, by exploring the
impact of forecasts elements/uncertainties on evacuations.
Coupled natural-human and agent-based models provide many opportunities for future
work. First, models with a more sophisticated representation of forecast intensity could
be used to further tease out the different effects of track, intensity, and forward speed
errors on evacuations e.g., to determine which elements are most important and should
be the focus of research and forecasting efforts. Second, the models could explore
additional questions such as: are there diminishing returns in improving aspects of
forecast accuracy on evacuation? How much does human input over models and
ensembles translate to evacuation success? And do forecasts help some groups
evacuate more than others? Similarly, models can be extended to additional weather
phenomenon such as tornadoes, potentially transforming public warning and protection
scenarios in these areas as well.
The models show promise for helping meteorology in the long term. As computing power
increases, and as empirical data on hurricane evacuation behaviors and traffic improves,
additional information can be codified into computational models, thus increasing their
realism, and subsequently, their ability to answer questions of interest. This emphasizes
the importance of funding social and behavioral science research within the weather
enterprise, and shows how, together, empirical and modeling studies provide many
opportunities to advance our understanding of the forecast’s role in the hurricane
forecast-evacuation system.
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ARTICLE 4
A LITERATURE REVIEW ON INEQUITIES IN HURRICANE EVACUATIONS
1. Introduction
Throughout this dissertation, we introduce an ABM built to investigate the complex
dynamics of the hurricane-forecast-evacuation system i.e., to determine which factors are
most important, key connections, and how factors interact across a range of real or
synthetic scenarios. The ABM framework, called FLEE, includes models of the natural
hazard (hurricane), the human system (information flow, evacuation decisions), the built
environment (road infrastructure), and connections between systems (forecasts and
warning information, traffic). Carless households are excluded from the modeling
framework, as these groups contribute less to evacuation traffic. However, FLEE, and
subsequent models like it, can be designed to include these groups, depending on the
research goals.
In this brief literature review, we investigate who carless households are in the US,
whether inequities exist in hurricane evacuations as a result, and how future hurricane
evacuation models can use the information to account for the inequities. The idea is to
help 1) ensure hurricane evacuation models like FLEE do not contribute to any inequities
by excluding minoritized groups, and 2) demonstrate how models can explore inequities
in the system across many forecast-population-infrastructure scenarios.
Specifically, we ask the following questions regarding inequities in hurricane
evacuations:

102

1. What research has been done regarding who can (and cannot) safely evacuate
before a hurricane i.e., who are the carless?
2. If inequities exist, how are current evacuation plans and policies addressing (or
contributing to) these inequities?
3. How can computational modeling frameworks help be a solution?
2.

Inequities in evacuation (the carless)

The question “who evacuates and why?” has motivated 40+ empirical studies
investigating how people respond to hurricane risks for actual hurricane events and in
hypothetical hurricane scenarios (see, e.g., reviews in Huang et al. 2016; Bowser and
Cutter 2015; Lazo et al. 2015; Dash and Gladwin 2007). Although predictors of evacuation
decisions vary across studies, a metaanalysis by Huang et al. (2016) found some
common factors. These include risk perceptions, official evacuation orders, storm
characteristics, and personal/situational characteristics such as mobile home residence.
Socioeconomic and demographic variables such as race, income, and disabilities have
effects on evacuations that are not entirely clear from these empirical studies (Bowser
and Cutter 2015; Huang et al. 2016). However, car ownership is a common predictor of
evacuation, with the carless being considerably less likely to evacuate (Huang et al.
2016). That said, we ask, who are the carless?
Answering this question is important to hurricane evacuations, as a non-insignificant
number of people are carless. Across the US, 8% of households are carless, a value that
has been fairly constant over the last decade. According to the 2017 census, the
percentage of carless households is highest in US coastal cities where hurricanes
103

frequent (e.g. New York City: 56%, Washington D.C.: 37%, Baltimore: 36%, Boston: 35%,
New Orleans: 27%, Providence: 22%, Miami: 20%, Tampa Bay: 11%, Orlando: 9%,
Houston: 8%).
When the carless population is stratified by demographics, huge racial disparities become
apparent. For example, 7% of white households are carless, compared to 24% of AfricanAmerican households, 17% of Latino households, and 13% of Asian-American
households (Sanchez et al. 2003). This makes African Americans and Latinos nearly 3.5
times and 2.5 times more likely to be carless than whites, respectively. People of color
make up a greater proportion of the nation’s largest coastal cities (e.g., Miami: 79%; New
Orleans: 73%; New York City: 65%; Houston: 58%). Of all 11 major cities that have seen
5+ hurricanes in the last 100 years (Houston, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Orlando,
Jacksonville, Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg, New York City, Providence, Boston, New
Orleans), those without a car are disproportionately people of color (Lui et al. 2006). As
described by Bullard and Wright (2011) a “transportation apartheid, a two-tiered system
of people with cars and people without cars, is alive and well in most metropolitan regions”
and is “firmly and nationally entrenched in American society.” These inequities are
apparent in who has access to vehicles for hurricane evacuations.
3.

Existing evacuation policies (or lack thereof)

Disasters such as hurricanes — and the inequities which result — have social, political,
and economic roots (Smith 2006) i.e., it has been emphasized by many in the hazards
community that there is no such thing as a natural disaster. Thus, it is important to
examine hurricane evacuation policies to identify the roots of inequities in car-lessness,

104

its effects on hurricane evacuations, and whether sufficient “transportation alternatives”
are provided.
Following Katrina, several nationwide evaluations of government evacuation plans were
conducted. These reports suggest that most plans – at the federal, state, and local levels
– assume citizens can evacuate on their own and provide little assistance to those who
cannot. For example:
•

A U.S. Government Accountability Office report determined that “state and local
governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate transportation
disadvantaged populations” (US GAO 2006).

•

The Department of Homeland Security’s assessment of evacuation plans for each
state and the 75 largest urban areas found “low-mobility and special-needs groups,
while included in most state emergency operation plans, has been largely
unaddressed by state DOTs” (DHS 2006).

A recent CDC report suggests the lack of government assistance for the transportation
disadvantaged remains a systematic, nationwide problem. According to Kruger et al.
(2020),
“Analysis of evacuation policies in eight southern U.S. coastal states in 2018 found
that all have laws to execute evacuation orders. However, only four have laws that
require informing racially and ethnically diverse populations and persons with
disabilities and functional needs of emergency evacuation plans. Only one state
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(Florida) authorized creation of a registry for persons with access and functional
needs for the purposes of evacuation and sheltering.”
In other words, the personal automobile remains the primary means of emergency
evacuation in most hurricane evacuation plans with little to no assistance provided
otherwise. These plans effectively privilege the middle-to upper-class, able-bodied, nonelderly, predominantly white households more likely to own cars, leaving behind less
mobile residents of American society.
4. Implications for computational models
The literature demonstrates inequities in car ownership, and subsequently, inequities in
who can easily evacuate. This is important context when interpreting results from
modeling studies, such as those in Articles 1–3 of this dissertation. Moving forward,
models aiming to improve the forecast-evacuation-system should include representations
of the carless, or at the very least, acknowledge their existence. Doing so ensures the
modeling frameworks do not contribute to inequities by excluding these groups when
studying the evacuation-system. Ideally, the models should be used to demonstrate the
advantages of using buses or providing cars for the carless (e.g., experiments in Article
2). In other words, modeling studies should quantify the value of government assistance
for various hurricane scenarios and thus encourage the development of equitable policies
across the country.
We are entering new territory where we can quantify forecast value through computational
models (e.g., experiments in Article 3). As a result, we need to establish a conception of
forecast and evacuation success which places the wellbeing of minoritized and
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disadvantaged peoples at the forefront. Ideas to help achieve this goal include 1) explicitly
considering the impact of forecasts on traditionally underserved communities and making
this the primary means of measuring forecast/evacuation success in research and
operational settings, and 2) emphasizing and supporting inclusive research techniques
such as community-based participatory research and co-production which empower
communities. With these types of considerations in mind, coupled natural-human models
of hurricane evacuation can be used to improve equity across the hurricane forecastevacuation system.
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CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this research was to holistically examine the dynamics of the hurricaneforecast-warning system from a novel, agent-based perspective that compliments and
builds-upon empirical work. This was accomplished through a series of manuscripts
discussing the following:
1. The agent-based model (FLEE)’s conceptualization, implementation, and
validation.
2. How FLEE’s evacuations change with evacuation management strategies and
policies, evolving population characteristics, and real and synthetic forecast
scenarios.
3. How changes in forecast elements (e.g., track and intensity) impact FLEE’s
evacuations, and whether accuracy improvements translate to evacuation
success.
4. The carless households in the US, the inequities which result, and ideas for
inclusive evacuation modeling moving forward.
Together, the studies provide a first-order assessment of the system’s dynamics, and
demonstrate the ability of coupled natural-human models to study – and improve –
hurricane evacuations. In other words, this dissertation serves as a starting point for
examining the forecast-evacuation system’s dynamics holistically i.e., to establish the
relative importance of factors, key interactions between systems, and the broader,
potentially non-evident emergent patterns.
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Moving forward, coupled natural-human modeling – and specifically agent-based
modeling – offers a promising research tool for the weather enterprise and hazards
communities. Firstly, models will improve as computing power increases. As things
currently stand, FLEE takes several days to run individual cases. One can envision,
however, models being used to run evacuation simulations in real or quasi-real-time.
Increased computing power also allows for increased level of detail in the models, and
subsequently, ability to answer questions of interest. Secondly, models can be extended
to study other regions or hazards, e.g., tornadoes, hurricanes followed by flooding, loss
of power networks, damage to roads, and other cascading failures. For meteorology, this
continues the process of improving forecast evaluation across the weather enterprise,
which helps make forecasts more useful to society. Thirdly, additional in-depth
comparisons with observational data can improve FLEE’s realism, and subsequently, its
capability to study evacuations i.e., computational models improve as empirical data
improves, and vice versa, effectively creating a feedback relationships between the two,
and an area of research that is promising long-term. For this reason, I intend to continue
agent-based hazards modeling, while simultaneously broadening expertise to include
empirical social science knowledge and methods (e.g., surveys, interviews etc.) over the
next few years. More broadly, I aim to be someone who can effectively straddle multiple
scholarly worlds (e.g., empirical vs modeling worlds, meteorology vs hazards worlds), and
in turn, continue to offer innovative perspectives to support the weather enterprise.
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APPENDIX A: Article 1
Wind

*Forecast

Forecast wind

Location in cone of

*Expected

risk

category

field

uncertainty

arrival time

1

<TS

None

Fully outside

Outside cone

2

TS-1

>34 kts

Mostly outside

>96 h

3

2-3

>50 kts

Mostly inside

48-96 h

4

4-5

>64 kts

Fully inside

<48 h

Weight

15%

50%

20%

15%

*Conditional upon being in the cone of uncertainty and/or within forecast wind radii
(=1 otherwise)
Table A1: Wind risk is calculated at each grid cell by assigning a risk score (1-4) based on the storm’s
forecast category at that location, its location in the forecast wind field (34, 50, 64+ knot intervals) which
depicts the size of the storm, location in the cone of uncertainty, and expected arrival time of tropical storm
force winds. The scores are weighted, summed, and rounded to the nearest integer to provide an overall
wind threat score (1-4) expressed as green-yellow-orange-red, respectively. Note: scores for the forecast
category and expected arrival time are set to 1 if the grid cell is not situated within the cone of uncertainty
and/or any forecast wind radii. When taken together, the products capture the wind’s critical forecast
elements (e.g., storm’s track, intensity, size, forward speed, amount of uncertainty, evolution with time,
imminency).
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Surge

*Inundatio

risk

n potential

*Forecas

*Forecas

t

t wind

category

field

1

None

<TS

None

2

Weak

TS-1

>34 kts

*Location
*Approach

in cone of

angle

uncertaint
y

*Expecte
d arrival
time

Outside

Fully

Outside

cone

outside

cone

Left of track

Mostly
outside

>96 h

Right of
3

Moderate

2-3

>50 kts

track, track

Mostly

parallel to

inside

48-96 h

shore
Right of
4

High

4-5

>64 kts

track, track

Fully

perpendicula

inside

<48 h

r to shore
Weigh
t

12%

12%

25%

16%

20%

15%

*Conditional upon being along shoreline (i.e., =1 inland) and upon being inside cone
of uncertainty and/or within forecast wind radii (=1 otherwise)
Table A2: Surge risk is determined at each grid cell by assigning a risk score (1-4) based on the cell’s
inundation potential (estimated using NHC’s potential storm surge inundation products), expected category
at that location, location within the forecast wind field (34, 50, 64+ knot intervals) which depicts the size of
the storm, the storm’s approach angle, the location in the cone of uncertainty, and the expected arrival time
of tropical storm force winds. The scores are weighted, summed, and rounded to the nearest integer to
provide an overall surge threat score (1-4) expressed as green-yellow-orange-red, respectively. Note:
scores for the expected category and expected arrival time are set to 1 if the grid cell is not situated within
the cone of uncertainty and/or the forecast wind radii. Likewise, the values are only calculated for areas
along the shoreline, as storm surge does not occur inland.
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*Storm

Forecast wind

Location in cone

*Expected arrival

speed

field

of uncertainty

time

1

Fast

None

Fully outside

Outside cone

2

Medium

>34 kts

Mostly outside

*>96 h

3

Slow

>50 kts

Mostly inside

*48-96 h

>64 kts

Fully inside

*<48 h

35%

20%

*15%

Rain risk

4

Weight

Nearly
stationary
30%

*Conditional upon being inside cone of uncertainty and/or within forecast wind radii
(=1 otherwise)
Table A3: Rain risk is calculated for each grid cell by assigning a risk score (1-4) based on the storm
speed (>15 knots, 10-15 knots, 5-10 knots, and <5 knots), location within the forecast wind field (34, 50,
64+ knot intervals) which estimates the size of the rain field, location in the cone of uncertainty, and the
expected arrival time of tropical storm force winds. The scores are weighted, summed, and rounded to the
nearest integer to provide an overall rain threat score (1-4) expressed as green-yellow-orange-red,
respectively. Note: scores for the expected category and forecast period are set to 1 if the grid cell is not
situated within the cone of uncertainty and/or the forecast wind radii. When taken together, the products
capture the rain’s critical forecast elements (e.g., storm’s track, size, forward speed, amount of uncertainty,
evolution with time, imminency).
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Variable

Variability Definition
in time

Values

Wind

Dynamic

Score from light system normalized to a
0-100 scale

Green = 0, Yellow = 33,
Orange = 66, Red = 100

Surge

Dynamic

Score from light system normalized to a
0-100 scale

Green = 0, Yellow = 33,
Orange = 66, Red = 100

Rain

Dynamic

Score from light system normalized to a
0-100 scale

Green = 0, Yellow = 33,
Orange = 66, Red = 100

Forecast

Dynamic

The highest score from the wind, rain,
and surge threats. This is used in a
household’s risk assessment

Values range from 0100

Evacuation
Orders

Dynamic

Is an evacuation order issued for the
household’s grid cell (yes/no)? This is
used in a household’s risk assessment

If yes = 100. If no = 0

Mobile
Home
Ownership

Static

Is the household in a mobile home
(yes/no)? This is used in a household’s
risk assessment

If yes = 100. If no = 0

Age

Static

1-5 score from the household’s grid cell
(Figure A1) normalized to 0-100 scale.
This is used in a household’s risk
assessment

If 1=20, If 2=40, If 3=60,
If 4=80, If 5=100

Household
Dynamic
risk
assessment

The sum of the forecast, evacuation
orders, mobile home ownership, and
age factors

Values range from 0400

Evacuation
barrier

If household has a car and household’s
risk assessment > socioeconomic
barrier, household will evacuate

Car ownership and
socioeconomic barrier in
Table A5

Static

Table A4: Key variables in the household evacuation decision-making algorithm. The algorithm’s
inputs (i.e., forecast, evacuation orders, mobile home ownership, age) are normalized onto a 0-100 scale
and summed to produce household risk assessment, which is then weighed against evacuation barriers to
produce a decision.
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Figure A1: Cell-by-cell distribution of agent characteristics identified by Huang et al. (2016) as being
important determinants of hurricane evacuations. These characteristics are spatially distributed by
subjectively projecting the county-level social vulnerability data (see Flanagan et al. 2011) onto the
abstracted, Florida-like agent-based model grid. Note, for reference, grid cells are 69 km by 69 km each.
Higher values for socioeconomic status and car ownership increase the evacuation barriers and thus
reduce the likelihood of evacuation. Higher values for age and mobile home ownership increase evacuation
intentions.
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Household
characteristics

Variability Definition
in time

Values

Socioeconomic Static
status

Establishes the
evacuation barrier
threshold. Low (high)
values indicate grid
cell has less (more)
financial obstacles to
evacuate

If = 1, barrier = random between 5-105
If = 2, barrier = random between 10-110
If = 3, barrier = random between 15-115
If = 4, barrier = random between 20-120
If = 5, barrier = random between 25-125

Car ownership

Static

Establishes whether
a household owns a
vehicle. Carless
households do not
evacuate

If = 1, 96% of households own car
If = 2, 94% of households own car
If = 3, 93% of households own car
If = 4, 91% of households own car
If = 5, 89% of households own car

Mobile home
ownership

Static

Establishes whether
a household lives in a
mobile home. If home
is mobile, will
increase risk
perception

If = 1, 5% of houses are mobile
If = 2, 10% of houses are mobile
If = 3, 20% of houses are mobile
If = 4, 33% of houses are mobile
If = 5, 46% of houses are mobile

Table A5: Prescribing agent characteristics to individual households. At the beginning of the
simulation, FLEE checks the agent’s location and subsequent values in Figure A1, then stochastically
assigns household characteristics at the values established above. These variables are static, meaning
they are assigned at the beginning of the simulation and do not change, but serve as inputs into the agent
decision-making algorithm as detailed in Table A4.
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Variable
weight

Variability Definition
in time

Values

Evacuation
order

Static

Trust in evacuation orders from EMs

Random between
0-1

Forecast

Static

Trust in forecast information i.e., the light
system

Random between
0-0.8

Mobile
home

Static

Agent belief in whether their housing type
influences perceived risk

Random between
0-10

Age

Static

Agent belief in whether household age
influences perceived risk

Random between
0-0.1

Wind

Static

Household’s perceived vulnerability to wind

Random between
0.1-1

Surge

Static

Household’s perceived vulnerability to surge

Random between
0-1

Rain

Static

Household’s perceived vulnerability to rain

Random between
0-0.9

Table A6: Weighting of key variables in a household’s risk assessment. Weights are designed to
reflect the relative importance of each factors (e.g., evacuation orders, forecast information, mobile home
ownership, and age, in that order) as established in Huang et al. (2016). For the individual hazards, studies
suggest most households perceive wind and surge as the primary threat over rain (e.g., Senkbeil et al.
2019). But in general, the relative weighting is not well known.
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Variable

Variability
in time

Definition

Default values

Departure
times

Static

Time between when an agent
decides to evacuate and when
they actually leave

Random between 0-12
hours

Destinations
(out-of-state)

Static

The number of evacuees who
evacuate out-of-state

50% of the bottom 4 rows
of grid cells; 100% of top 6
rows

Destinations
(in-state)

Static

The number of accommodations
available in each grid cell for instate-evacuees

½ of grid cell’s population
(i.e., metros have more
accommodations)

Patience
threshold

Dynamic

Household patience i.e., the
amount of time a household is
willing to spend waiting to get
onto a heavily trafficked road

Random between 0 and
the estimated time of
arrival of tropical storm
force wind

Left/right

Static

Agents in the bottom row of grid
cells can choose between moving
westward/eastward on the lower
interstate

40% westward, 60%
eastward

Erratic drivers

Static

Percent of time steps (1.2
seconds) in which a driver may
act “erratically” by randomly
slowing down

0.05%

Random
accident
frequency

Static

The frequency of accidents along
the two outer interstates i.e., I-95
and I-75. These stop traffic for 10
minutes.

1-3 random accidents per
hour

Table A7: Key variables for the traffic agent-based model. These parameters are the default settings
for the experiments detailed in Section 4.1. Static variables are assigned once a vehicle decides to evacuate
and does not change, whereas dynamic variables do change throughout the simulation.
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Supplementary Results 1 -

Varying household’s weighting of different types of

information
Next, we investigate the effects of changing household agent’s weightings of the four
factors that influence their hurricane risk assessment: the forecast, evacuation orders,
mobile home ownership, and age. For each experiment, we set the information weights
to zero, effectively “turning off” each parameter, one-by-one, while holding the others
constant (Table 3e). When comparing the results to the default settings in Section 4.1,
the experiments demonstrate the specific influence of the different information on the
evacuation behaviors, both spatially and temporally.
In Irma’s default simulation (Section 4.1), 45.1% of households evacuate. However,
turning off the information for evacuation orders, the forecast, mobile home, and age, oneby-one, results in evacuation rates of 28.3%, 33.2%, 40.6%, and 44.8%, respectively.
Similarly, in the default simulation, where 10.5% of households give up due to traffic,
turning off the inputs reduces the rate to 2.6%, 8.1%, 9.8%, and 9.3%, respectively (Table
A8). In other words, the results indicate that, in the model’s current formulation,
evacuation rates are generally more sensitive to evacuation orders than they are to
forecast information, mobile home ownership, and age. However, this is zone dependent
e.g., evacuation orders has a greater influence in coastal zones, and mobile homes have
a greater influence upstate/inland. The former is due to model formulation (evacuation
orders are limited to coastal zones) and the latter due to the geographic distribution of
mobile homes (e.g., as shown in Figure A1). That said, we cannot draw conclusions (or
interpret the model dynamics) based on these findings. Rather, we can say the relative
importance of these factors is generally consistent with the metaanalysis of Huang et al.
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(2016), which we used to prescribed the information weightings, thus adding confidence
that the model behaves reasonably.
Breaking down the experiments by impact zones shows that, as expected, evacuation
orders primarily impact evacuations along the coast. For example, turning off the
evacuation order parameter decreases evacuation rates in the coastal >64 knot zone
from 52.3% to 31.9%, while inland evacuation rates remain the same (Table A8).

% Successfully evacuated
Experiment

Total Coastal Inland
(all
>64
>64
cells) knot
knot
zone
zone

Coastal
< 64
kts
zone

Inland Compliance Shadow
Gave
< 64
rates
evacuation up to
kts
traffic
zone

Irma Default

45.1

52.3

22.2

58.1

36.7

55.0

25.6

10.5

EO = 0

28.3

31.9

24.0

25.5

36.9

29.0

26.9

2.6

Forecast = 0

33.2

38.2

11.7

45.3

26.5

41.4

17.5

8.1

MH = 0

40.6

48.5

17.3

54.9

14.2

51.4

16.6

9.8

Age = 0

44.8

51.3

22.3

56.4

35.0

53.6

25.3

9.3

Table A8: Evacuation behaviors by impact zone when varying household weighting of information.
Successful evacuation rates are broken down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas experiencing
vs. not experiencing hurricane force winds of 64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed to evacuate
via evacuation order who did evacuate), shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people not instructed
to evacuate who did), and the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave up” due to
excessive amounts of traffic.
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Figure A2 shows evacuation rates and traffic broken down by grid cell. Note, in this figure,
rates are expressed as the departure from the default settings in Figure 7. The results
further show how evacuation orders are a strong determinant of evacuation rates, as
turning off the parameter reduces evacuation rates from 7% to 40% in places along the
coast (Figure A2b). Note: turning off evacuation orders increases evacuation rates in the
inland Miami suburbs, as traffic is reduced in the surrounding coastal areas. This
highlights how evacuation rates in a given grid cell are also influenced by those in other
grid cells. Unlike evacuation orders, the other three parameters (Figure A2 a, c-d) exhibit
a more uniform influence on evacuation rates across FLEE’s grid. Areas most influenced
by mobile home and age information occur in grid cells where rates of mobile home
ownership are highest, and where age is expected to play a larger role (Figure A1, see
cells with higher ranking). Though such information does not provide any new behavioral
insights, it does verify that FLEE behaves as expected given the model’s current
configuration, and is capable of capturing complex processes (e.g., evacuation behaviors
in one part of the model influencing those in other areas). These results increase our
confidence that FLEE adequately represents real-world evacuations and is suitable for
further experimentation.
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Figure A2: The spatial effects of “turning off” information inputs on evacuations rates and percent
“giving up” from traffic for grid cells. Results are presented for experiments “turning off” the forecast
information (a), evacuation orders (b), mobile home ownership (c), and age (d), one-by-one while holding
the other parameters constant. Values are shown as the departure from the default settings in section 4.1
and in Figure 7f-g. Also presented is the swath of hurricane force winds (dotted cells), evacuation orders
(red cells), and the population by grid cell (e) which provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted
include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star),
and Orlando (orange star). Note, run-to-run variability due to stochastic elements in the model ranges from
0–2% in grid cells for both evacuation rates and percent giving up due to traffic. Therefore values of -2 to 2
lie within that variability and are insignificant.
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Figure A3 shows the importance of the different information on certain periods during the
evacuation. For example, turning off evacuation orders (red lines) causes a reduction in
evacuation rates compared to the default simulation (black lines), especially during the
36–102 hour period when evacuation orders were issued. Forecast information (purple
lines) most influences evacuation rates between 30–60 hours, as forecasts indicated
significant risk throughout Florida during this period. Unlike evacuation orders and
forecast information, modifying the age (orange lines) and mobile home (green lines)
factors do not impact any specific periods of time, but simply reduces the evacuation rates
overall. This is to be expected, as these parameters are defined at the start of the
simulation and are not updated.
In summary, the simulations in this section illustrate how modifying the factors that
influence households’ evacuation decisions in the human system agent-based model
propagate through FLEE’s full modeling system to influence the spatial and temporal
patterns of evacuation. In general, the results suggest FLEE behaves as expected given
the model’s current configuration, and matches patterns seen in empirical studies which
suggest forecast/warning information is a key driver for evacuations (e.g., Wong et al.
2018; Huang et al. 2016). Additionally, the results illustrate how modeling laboratories
such as this can build our understanding of the evacuation decision-making processes
and how they intersect with other factors (e.g., the evolving forecast information, traffic)
to produce evacuations.
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Figure A3: The temporal effects of “turning off” information inputs on the timing of evacuation rates
(solid lines) and numbers giving up due to traffic (dashed lines), averaged across all grid cells. The default
simulation (Table 3a; section 4.1) is expressed (black lines), as are experiments turning off the four main
types of information used to assess risk: no forecast information (purple lines), no evacuation orders (red
lines), no mobile home ownership (green lines), and no age (orange lines). Comparing the experiments to
the default experiment (black lines) provides a general sense of the relative importance of the parameter
on the overall evacuation behaviors. Also shown is the simulation where the population density is uniform
(grey lines), which is further described in Supplementary Results 2.
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Supplementary Results 2 - Varying geographical distribution of households
In this section, we investigate FLEE’s behavior when the non-uniform geographical
distribution of households in the default settings is changed to a uniform population
distribution (Table 3f) i.e., where the 16.4 million residents (4.1 million households) are
spread evenly across grid cells. As a result, the experiment is a first attempt to explore
the effects of population density on evacuations, as this cannot be done empirically, and
it demonstrates how FLEE can be used to run different scenarios with population shifts,
e.g., times of year when there are a lot of tourists in certain areas, looking 10+ years out
for how evacuations may change as the population grows.
In total, evacuation rates increase from 45.1% in the default simulation to 49.9% when
the population distribution is uniform, which is an increase of 786,720 people (Table A9).
Meanwhile rates of households unable to evacuate due to excessive traffic decrease from
10.5% in the default simulation to 3.5%, a decrease of 1,147,300 people. Thus, the
experiments suggest the real-world, non-uniform population density substantially
increases evacuation traffic and reduce evacuation rates.
A more in-depth look reveals an interesting pattern in the spatial distribution of evacuation
behaviors. In most places, evacuation rates are higher than in default while traffic is
minimal (Figure A4, bottom panel); the exception is the southern “coastal” cells where
rates unable to evacuate due to traffic increase 12–17%, particularly around Miami, which
reduces evacuation rates by 9–17%. One possible explanation is that the southern cells
have 1) more evacuees than in the default run and 2) more evacuees downstream i.e.,
the area is “last in line” to evacuate based on the available road network. It is also possible
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that we are seeing the impacts of clearance times being out of balance with what the
clearance times would be in a world with this revised population density.
The results quantify contributions of the built environment to the evacuations.
Furthermore, they illustrate the significant and potentially complex effects of population
density on the evacuation success, which should be explored further. The experiment
also shows how, in a modeling laboratory such as this, different components can be
modified systematically to isolate influences which are impossible to do empirically, and
highlights the potential value of this type of modeling laboratory to increasing our
fundamental understanding of the system dynamics, and our understanding how
evacuations may change as the population grows.

% Successfully evacuated
Experiment

Total Coastal Inland
(all
>64
>64
cells) knot
knot
zone
zone

Coastal
< 64
kts
zone

Inland Compliance Shadow
Gave
< 64
rates
evacuation up to
kts
traffic
zone

Irma Default

45.1

52.3

22.2

58.1

36.7

55.0

25.6

10.5

Uniform pop.

49.9

65.3

29.7

62.3

36.9

64.1

32.5

3.5

Table A9: Evacuation behaviors by impact zones when making the population uniform across the
grid. Successful evacuation rates are broken down into impact zones (coastal vs. inland, and areas
experiencing vs. not experiencing hurricane force winds of 64+ kts), compliance rates (i.e., those instructed
to evacuate via evacuation order who did evacuate), shadow evacuation rates (i.e., percentage of people
not instructed to evacuate who did), and the percentage of evacuees who attempted to evacuate but “gave
up” due to excessive amounts of traffic.
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Figure A4: Influence of population density on evacuation for grid cells. Evacuation rates (left) and the
percent of households unable to evacuate due to traffic (right) are shown. Results are presented for the
experiment where population density is even across all grid cells (top panel). These results are compared
to the default simulation with non-uniform population (bottom panel) where values are expressed as the
difference from the default settings in section 4.1 and in Figure 7. Also expressed is the swath of hurricane
force winds (dotted cells), evacuation orders (red cells), and the population by grid cell (c) which provide a
frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St.
Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star), and Orlando (orange star). Note, run-to-run variability due
to stochastic elements in the model ranges from 0–2% in grid cells for both evacuation rates and percent
giving up due to traffic. Therefore values of -2 to 2 lie within that variability and should be ignored.
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APPENDIX B: Article 2

Original parameters

Updated parameters

Intended effect

Instantaneous
communication – forecasts
and warning information were
received immediately by
households to begin the
evacuation decision-making
process

Households are randomly
assigned a value between 024 hours. This is the amount
of time needed to receive
information before making
evacuation decisions

To provide a more realistic
account of information
diffusion (e.g., see Morss et
al. 2017)

Evacuation barriers are static
and do not change

Evacuation barriers are
raised by 36 initially and
decrease linearly to their
original values in HRM21 by
54 hours before landfall

To prevent too many people
from evacuating early in the
simulations e.g., upstate and
inland in the Irma and Dorian
simulations

Mobile home ownership
weighting in household
evacuation decision-making
algorithm: Random between
0-10

Mobile home ownership
weighting in household
evacuation decision-making
algorithm: Random between
0-0.5

To reduce unsensible
variability between grid cells,
particularly inland

Socioeconomic status
weighting in household
evacuation decision-making
algorithm: Random between
5-125

Socioeconomic status
weighting in household
evacuation decision-making
algorithm: Random between
5-109

To reduce unsensible
variability between grid cells,
particularly inland

Table B1: Updates to the model since HRM21. This includes describing the original model parameters,
their updates, and the reasoning behind them.
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Figure B1: The percentage of coastal grid cells receiving evacuation orders, if issued for the cell. Also
expressed is the population by grid cell (b). These provide a frame of reference e.g., major cities depicted
include Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (yellow star), Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg (blue star), Jacksonville (green star),
and Orlando (orange star). Values are based on Figure 2 of Wong et al. (2018), Florida Department of
Emergency Management (personal communication), Figure 1 of Darzi et al. (2020).
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Information
category

Evacuation
orders

Evacuation rates

Evacuation traffic

Storm

Data
specifics

Sources

Irma

Counties,
evacuation
zones

Figure 2 of Wong et al. (2018), Florida
Department of Emergency Management
(personal communication), Figure 1 of Darzi et
al. (2020)

Dorian

Counties,
evacuation
zones

TIME (2019)

Irma

By region

Figure 4 of Wong et al. (2018)

Irma

By voting
precinct

Figure 1c of Long et al. (2020)

Irma

By county

Table 10 of Martin et al. (2020)

Irma

By state

Florida Department of Emergency
Management (2017), Figure 6 of Wong et al.
(2018), Figure 2c of Long et al. (2020)

Irma

By city

Feng and Lin (2021)

Dorian

Storm total

Mongold et al (2020)

Irma

Areas/times
Page 15 of Wong et al. (2018), Ghorbanzadeh
of congestion et al. (2021), States et al. (2021)

Irma

Total
numbers
stuck

Feng and Lin (2021)

Table B2: Empirical information used to validate FLEE. This includes a description of the information,
which storm the data is form, and the exact source.
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APPENDIX C: Article 3
Hours until
landfall
120

Irma Advisory
No.
25

Dorian-LF
Advisory No.
17

2001 average
errors (km)
601

2021 average
errors (km)
319

114

26

18

564

299

108

27

19

527

279

102

28

20

490

260

96

29

21

453

240

90

30

22

433

223

84

31

23

412

207

78

32

24

392

190

72

33

25

370

174

66

34

26

342

160

62

35

27

314

146

54

36

28

287

132

48

37

29

259

118

42

38

30

229

104

36

39

31

200

90

30

40

32

170

78

24

41

33

138

67

18

42

34

116

55

12

43

35

94

43

6

44

36

72

27

0

45

37

50

13

Table C1: Average track errors in 2001 and 2021, expressed in km for every 6 hours leading up to landfall.
These values were taken from the NHC website (https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/index.shtml), were
extrapolated from 24 to 6 hour intervals, and matched to the equivalent advisory numbers from the official
NHC forecasts for Irma and Dorian. Based off this information, track errors were perturbed left/right of the
original NHC forecast track by amounts in this table.
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Figure C1: Irma’s 2001 left track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every 6
hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category (numbers),
cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink), and 64+
(red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow). Right three
columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge, and rain are
shown for equivalent times.
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Figure C2: Irma’s 2021 left track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every 6
hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category (numbers),
cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink), and 64+
(red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow). Right three
columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge, and rain are
shown for equivalent times.
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Figure C3: Irma’s 2021 right track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every
6 hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow).
Right three columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge, and
rain are shown for equivalent times.

143

Figure C4: Irma’s 2001 right track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every
6 hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow).
Right three columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge, and
rain are shown for equivalent times.
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Figure C5: Irma’s RI/RO forecasts. Here we shorten the forecast timeline of the original NHC forecasts
shown in Figure 22 from 168 hours to 84 hours. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every
6 hours (not shown). The peak magnitudes of risk (wind, surge, rain) for each grid cell are the same as
Irma; however, the timelines are condensed, effectively creating large and intertwined forward speed,
intensity, and track errors meant to emulate the effects of rapid onset/intensity cases.
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Figure C6: Irma’s RI/RO – 12 forecasts. Here we shorten the forecast timeline of the original NHC
forecasts shown in Figure 22 from 168 hours to 72 hours. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but
update every 6 hours (not shown). The peak magnitudes of risk (wind, surge, rain) for each grid cell are
the same as Irma; however, the timelines are condensed, effectively creating large and intertwined forward
speed, intensity, and track errors meant to emulate the effects of rapid onset/intensity cases.
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Figure C7: Evacuation rates over time for Irma’s experiments. The temporal effects of the experiments
on evacuation rates (solid lines) and numbers giving up due to traffic (dashed lines), averaged across grid
cells, throughout the simulations. The default simulation is expressed (black lines), as are RI/RO (dark red
lines), RI/RO – 12 (light red lines), 2021 left (dark green lines), 2001 left (light green lines), 2021 right
(purple lines), 2001 right (blue lines).
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Figure C8: Dorian LF’s 2001 left track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update
every 6 hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow).
Right three columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge,
and rain are shown for equivalent times.
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Figure C9: Dorian’s 2021 left track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update every
6 hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow).
Right three columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge,
and rain are shown for equivalent times.
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Figure C10: Dorian’s 2021 right track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update
every 6 hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow).
Right three columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge,
and rain are shown for equivalent times.
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Figure C11: Dorian LF’s 2001 right track forecasts. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but update
every 6 hours (not shown). Left column: Official evolving NHC forecast track (black center line), category
(numbers), cone of uncertainty (edges are outer black lines), and current wind radii at 34 (white), 50 (pink),
and 64+ (red) knot intervals. The approximate track of the perturbed forecasts is shown (orange arrow).
Right three columns: The light system threats corresponding to the perturbed forecasts for wind, surge,
and rain are shown for equivalent times.

151

Figure C12: Dorian LF’s RI/RO forecasts. Here we shorten the forecast timeline of the original NHC
forecasts shown in Figure 22 from 168 hours to 84 hours. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but
update every 6 hours (not shown). The peak magnitudes of risk (wind, surge, rain) for each grid cell are
the same as Dorian LF; however, the timelines are condensed, effectively creating large and intertwined
forward speed, intensity, and track errors meant to emulate the effects of rapid onset/intensity cases.
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Figure C13: Dorian LF’s RI/RO – 12 forecasts. Here we shorten the forecast timeline of the original NHC
forecasts shown in Figure 22 from 168 hours to 72 hours. Forecasts are shown for every 24 hours but
update every 6 hours (not shown). The peak magnitudes of risk (wind, surge, rain) for each grid cell are
the same as Dorian-LF; however, the timelines are condensed, effectively creating large and intertwined
forward speed, intensity, and track errors meant to emulate the effects of rapid onset/intensity cases.
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Figure C14: Evacuation rates over time for Dorian LF’s experiments. The temporal effects of the
experiments on evacuation rates (solid lines) and numbers giving up due to traffic (dashed lines), averaged
across grid cells, throughout the simulations. The default simulation is expressed (black lines), as are
RI/RO (light red lines), RI/RO – 12 (dark red lines), 2021 left (dark green lines), 2001 left (light green lines),
2021 right (purple lines), 2001 right (blue lines).
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